Equity buying by corporate insiders and filing of antidumping complaints. by Nam, Hae Me.
INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the 
text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and 
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of 
computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the  copy 
subm itted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and 
photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment 
can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a  complete manuscript and 
there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright 
material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g.. maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning 
the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to 
right in equal sections with small overlaps.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9" black and white photographic 
prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for 
an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
Bell & Howell Information and Learning 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Artsor, Ml 48106-1346 USA
U lM I
800-521-0600

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE
EQUITY BUYING BY CORPORATE INSIDERS AND FILING OF ANTIDUMPING
COMPLAINTS
A Dissertation 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
By
Hae Me Nam 
Norman, Oklahoma 
1999
UMI N um ber 9949709
UMI
UMI Microform9949709 
Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Leaming Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Titie 17, United States Code.
Bell & Howell Information and Leaming Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. 60x1346  
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
c Copyright by Hae Me Nam 1999 
All Rights Reserved.
EQUITY BUYING BY CORPORATE INSIDERS AND FILING OF ANTIDUMPING
COMPLAINTS
A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
BY
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
There were many days when I didn’t think I’d make it. I sometimes even 
questioned my desire to obtain a Ph.D. in Economics. I didn’t think I was cut out to 
be an economist, so I would ask myself, “what am I doing?” It’s something my 
Chair, Dr. Hartigan once said, “Nammette, I got my Ph.D., so I won’t have to drive a 
cab”. The only difference is that Dr. Hartigan is a well renowned, respected 
economist in his field. Me, I’m just barely making it but his statement made sense to 
me. I’m not really qualified to do anything else, so why not this?
Anyway, I would like to thank Dr. James Hartigan, my advisor and mentor 
who’ve helped me produce a quality dissertation by providing a really interesting 
topic and inspiring me to do well. He somehow knew that I’m one of those creatures 
who need to be pushed, and trust me, he pushed and pushed and.... Sometimes, he 
kept pushing and pushing, till there were days when I just couldn’t stand him. He 
even made a statement that if I didn’t hate him by the time that I was wrapping up my 
dissertation, then he wasn’t doing his job. I can support his statement and say that he 
was doing his job way too well. Although, he sometimes made my life a living hell, 
he would do or say something that would let me know that the reason he was pushing 
so hard was because he wanted me to do well. And, I am very grateful for that.
I also like to thank my committee members. Dr. Zhen Zhu, Dr. Ramkumar 
Parthasarathy, Dr. Georgia Kosmopoulou and finally. Dr. Cynthia Rogers, who by the 
way provided me with moral support as well as essential items to accomplish writing 
my dissertation. They were all very supportive of my desire to finish. I would 
especially like to thank someone from outside of my committee. Dr. Timothy Dunne,
IV
who went above and beyond to help me with my dissertation. Without his help. I’d 
still probably be struggling through my dissertation.
There are others who 1 would like to thank for helping me accomplish my 
dream. I definitely couldn’t have done this without my parents. They were my solid 
support. They were there for me through all the rough rides. Whenever, I felt I was 
too stupid or too incompetent, they were there to cheer me on and tell me that 1 could 
do it. They would say “Haeme, I know you, once you set your mind to do something, 
you’re not going to quit until you’ve accomplished it”, and that was that. They just 
believed in me. I believe they earned this degree for me.
My sisters, Hae Jin and Hae Sung who are also my best friends are the 
greatest. They are my companions, my advisors and my therapists. They would 
comfort me with words of confidence and tell me things that would make me see 
things in a whole new way. Whenever I was feeling antsy and/or imeasy, it was my 
sisters who kept me at peace. When I was in a bad mood or when 1 lost my data 
because my computer crashed it was my sisters who kept me sane. They were the 
first ones I’d call. No matter what time of day I’d call, they would always do 
everything in their power to cheer me up. I’d like to thank them for being there for 
me. Without their help I’d be lost forever.
I liked to also thank my brother, Hyun who helped me with all my computer 
problems. He saved the day when he was able to retrieve my data. And I liked to 
thank Dan Coleman, my brother-in-law for not only putting up with me in his and 
Hae Jin’s new home for couple of months but also for being supportive of my dream. 
He never made feel un-welcomed or as if  1 inconvenienced him in anyway.
I also like to thank my friends and colleagues: Leeva Chung, Theresa and 
Glenn Burnett, Priya Ramkumar, Ling-Wei Chung, Sui Zhiato, Nury Effenidi, Tami 
Kinsky and Trent Barnes.
VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................1
IL LITERATURE REVIEW..............................................................................................6
A. USE OF FINANCIAL DATA TO ASSESS TRADE POLICY.........................6
1. In t r o d u c t io n ................................................................................................................ 6
2 . E ven t  St u d ie s  w it h  a  C o n s t a n t  P a r a m e t e r ...............................................7
3. E ven t  St u d ie s  W it h  V a r y in g  P a r a m e t e r ................................................. 12
B. USE OF FINANCIAL DATA TO INVESTIGATE INSIDER TRADING....26
1. In t r o d u c t io n ..............................................................................................................26
2 . In sid e r  T r a d in g  W it h  P r iv a t e  In f o r m a t io n ...........................................27
III. DATA AND METHODS............................................................................................49
A . D e sc r ipt io n  o f  D a t a ............................................................................................................ 49
B. M e t h o d s .....................................................................................................................................52
1. F ixed  E f f e c t s ..............................................................................................................53
2 . R a n d o m  E f f e c t s ....................................................................................................... 55
3. P r e d ic t e d  R e s u l t s  FROM THE G e n e r a l  M o d e l ........................................ 57
4 . M odel  R e -S p e c if ic a t io n s :...................................................................................60
IV. RESULTS.................................................................................................................... 67
A . E st im a t in g  t h e  g e n e r a l  m o d e l ...............................................................................67
B . E x a m in in g  D b t , o n e  o f  t h e  v a r ia b l e s  t h a t  m e a su r e st h e
H e a l t h  OF F IR M S ............................................................................................................ 70
C . E x a m in in g  E P S , a n o t h e r  f u n d a m e n t a l  m e a su r e s  t h a t
GAUGE THE HEALTH OF FIRM S....................................................................... 72
D. In s id e r s ’ po t e n t ia l  t o  e a r n  r e n t s ........................................................................75
E. In te r a c t io n  b e t w e e n  a n t id u m p in g  pe t it io n  a n d  t h e
MARKET CAPITALIZATION...............................................................................................77
F. S u m m a r y   ................................................................................................ 80
V. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................... 82
VI. APPENDIX................................................................................................................. 86
VII. REFERENCES............................................................................................................ 89
Vll
I. INTRODUCTION:
The term insider trading refers to stock transactions made by corporate officers, 
those individuals who are responsible for the overall operations of the firm. They are the 
main decision-makers with access to information about their firms’ prospects before any 
current or potential asset holders. Many securities investors believe that corporate 
insiders use such information to buy and sell their own firm’s stock at favorable times, 
reaping significant profit. ‘
The Securities and Exchange Act o f 1934 and the rules promulgated thereunder 
regulate individuals or corporate entities from engaging in certain activities such as 
insider trading. Under this Act, corporate insiders are required to report to the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) any insider trading activity. The purpose o f the Act is to 
eliminate or reduce the unfair advantage that corporate insiders possess. The SEC may 
investigate insider trading activity, especially if trading occurs before public 
announcements of certain information regarding a firm’s operations or prospects are 
made. However, not all insider trading on insider information triggers SEC investigation.
Insider information that may not trigger SEC investigation is the filing of 
antidumping (AD) complaints. Our contention is that insiders can use filing of AD 
complaints as insider information and benefit firom trading on this information. Under 
the Antidumping Act of 1921, if  a U.S. firm accuses a foreign firm of dumping in the 
U.S. market, the Commerce Department must compare the price of the goods in the home 
market of the foreign firm and the price those goods are sold in the U.S. market. If the
‘ O ur dependent variable represents insider buying rather than selling because buying is a clear signal. 
Insider buying discloses infonnation on how insiders view the expected future value o f the firm. Selling, 
on the other hand, is a noisy signal because it can represent pessimism about the expected future value o f
U.S. price does not reflect “fair market value,” as determined by the Commerce 
Department, the foreign firm can be found guilty o f dumping.^
A guilty verdict imposed on a foreign firm is assumed to protect the domestic firm 
from foreign competition thus, making the domestic firm more attractive to investors. If 
this assumption is accurate, then we can further assume that corporate insiders with 
access to information regarding the filing of AD can benefit from it. Because decision to 
file for AD complaints is non-public information, corporate insiders can earn rent by 
purchasing equity before or at the time of filing if  it is found to be valid.
We examine this by observing the relationship between the purchases of equity 
share by corporate insiders and the filing of AD complaints. By examining this 
relationship, we can address certain policy issues. It allows policy makers to consider 
issues they might not have considered otherwise. Furthermore, it provides information 
on insider trading behavior.
The effect of trade policies upon factor returns has been of interest to international 
economists since the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) Theorem.^ Because our observation 
stems from investigating trade protection and its relation to AD petitions, there is great 
interest to international economists.
In this study, we address trade policies in the form of AD petitions and insider 
buying behavior. Recall that our contention was that corporate insiders can potentially 
benefit from AD petitions if insiders buy before or at the time of filing. The potential 
benefit for insiders from AD petitions exist because filing o f AD complaints can protect
the firm. Insider selling can also occur for reasons unrelated to the insiders’ view o f the prospectus o f the 
firm.
 ^“A guide to antidumping laws: American’s Unfair Trade Practice” Bryan T. Johnson (1992).
the firm from foreign competition, thus making the equity of the firm more valuable. 
Therefore, if insiders buy securities before filing of AD complaints becomes public 
information, insiders can potentially earn rents.
In addition to the trade issue, this study is the first research to focus on the buying 
activities of insiders in the context of AD investigations. Because insiders are more 
likely to be better informed about their firm's prospects than other asset holders, we can 
also assert that insiders have access to information regarding the effect of international 
competition and the possible introduction o f AD duties on the firm’s vitality."*
Previous studies have focused on analyzing whether or not security holders of 
firms involved in AD investigations earn abnormal returns. However, this is the first to 
investigate the relationship between insider buying and filing of AD complaints.
Prior studies that examined the relationship between AD investigations and 
abnormal returns have been conducted by economists such as, Hartigan, Perry and 
Kamma (1986, 1989, 1998), Krupp and Pollard (1996), Lenway, Rehbein and Starks 
(1990), and Rehbein and Starks (1995). Each study utilized an event study analysis to 
assess whether or not security holders o f firms involved in AD investigations earn 
abnormal returns. Because there are investors with varying degrees o f information, event 
studies do not reveal how the most informed participants view the AD petition; therefore, 
event study analysis is not appropriate for our study.
Lastly, our interest in studying the relationship between insider buying activity 
and filing of AD complaints concerns the integrity of the securities market itself. SEC
 ^ Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that under the assumption o f  perfectly mobile capital, the real return to 
capital will either rise in all sectors or fall in all sectors depending on the country’s factor endowments.
See Maur (1998). He has documented that the highest executive levels o f  a firm are responsible for any 
AD disputes.
proscribes trading by corporate insiders upon material information that is not yet in the 
public dom ain/ If  insiders trade securities before an announcement such as earnings, 
mergers or acquisitions are made the SEC is more likely to investigate insiders for insider 
trading. Therefore, to comply with the SEC prohibition, firms typically impose a “quiet 
period,” usually a month prior to an announcement. During this period, insiders are not 
allowed to trade. Subsequent to the announcement, they are permitted to buy or sell 
within approximately two weeks.
From these premises, our concern is whether or not an AD petition triggers SEC 
investigation if  buying takes place. In other words, is the AD petition considered private 
information that falls in the same category as earnings, mergers or acquisitions; and if so, 
does the SEC also proscribe insiders from trading before the filing o f  AD complaints? It 
is not the sort o f factual disclosure for which a quiet period is usually imposed. However, 
it may provide the opportunity for insiders to gain valuable information at the expense of 
other traders. If the SEC proscribes insiders from trading during the filing of AD 
petitions, firms can also impose a quiet period during the filing o f AD complaints.
Previous studies of insider trading have focused on whether or not insiders earn 
abnormal returns including the examination of the extent to which insider trading 
conveys private information to the market. Examples include Baesel and Stein (1979), 
Damodaren and Liu (1993), Elliot, Morse, and Richardson (1984), Finnerty (1976), 
Givoly and Palmon (1985), Seyhun (1986), and Udpa (1996).
Besides our contention that a relationship exists between insider buying and filing 
of AD complaints, we also provide evidence regarding other market and firm
 ^ By material information, we mean information, which would cause a reasonable investor to buy or sell the 
stock.
characteristics that are related to such insider activity. We not only use filing of AD 
complaints in our model, but we also employ firm and market indicators, such as price, 
earnings per share, market capitalization, debt-equity ratio, and S&P 500 index. Our 
rationale for using such measures is to verify that insiders, like any other informed 
investors, study these variables when making an equity purchase. As such, it contributes 
to that literature as well as that of administered protection.
We invoked Fixed Effects Conditional Logit (FECL) and Random Effects Probit 
(REP) model to perform our study. We find that our results are robust to either 
specification regarding a significant positive relationship between insider buying and 
filing of AD petitions. Our study is presented as follows: Chapter 11 is the literature 
review; Chapter III is the methods and data; Chapter IV is the results; and Chapter V is 
the conclusion.
n . LITERATURE REVIEW:
A. USE OF FINANCIAL DATA TO ASSESS TRADE POLICY
1. In t r o d u c t io n :
The effect of trade policies on various aspects of U.S. economy has always been 
the subject of interest to many international economists. One interest in particular is the 
effect o f trade policies on the U.S. stock market because it discloses the value o f the 
policy to firm. To examine the impact o f trade policies on the U.S. economy, many 
economists use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with event study analysis. The 
CAPM is a theoretical model that estimates a normal relationship between stock market 
rate of return and individual firm’s rate of return. The CAPM in conjunction with an 
event study analysis can be used to study stock market behavior.
There are two types of event study analysis. The first type is based on a constant 
parameter. In this type of analysis adjustment o f beta parameter is not possible (e.g. beta 
parameter being the slope coefficient). The purpose of using CAPM with event study 
analysis is to capture the abnormal behavior of the market based on certain event or 
events. For example, Hartigan, Kamma and Perry (1986) employed an event study with 
a constant parameter to examine the relationship between trade protection and stock 
market behavior. They wanted to observe if requests for trade protection and subsequent 
administrative decisions had any impact on the market value of the common stock. In 
this mode the appeal for protection and the subsequent administrative decisions are 
different events.
The problem with this method is that with a constant parameter only one event 
can be considered at a time. To compute the impact of different events on the stock
market, for example, we would have to estimate separate models for each event. The 
single coefficient estimate provides information on one event.
Another problem with event study analysis that uses a constant parameter is that it 
lacks information updating. Updating information is important because one event, 
although not directly impacting market behavior may be a direct cause o f another event 
which directly affects market behavior. Without updating information only the direct 
event can be observed thus producing results that is either overstated or understated.
The second type of event study analysis allows the estimated coefficient to vary 
with different events. It estimates a separate coefficient for every different event within a 
model consequently; separate estimations are not necessary. Thompson (1993) employed 
this method to estimate the parameters o f each event that was relevant to the 
implementation of the United States — Canada, free trade agreement (FTA). She 
observed if  each such event had an impact on the implementation of FTA and on the 
value of common stock.
This type of event study is more advantageous since it considers all the different 
events and estimates the coefficients accordingly. However, such method has its own 
drawbacks. There is no objective method for the selection of events. Two people doing 
the same study may select different events to get to their results. Regardless, this type of 
event study analysis is very useful because it allows different perspectives on the effects 
o f trade policies on the economy and presents diverse ideas for policy makers.
2. E v e n t  S t u d ie s  w it h  a  C o n s t a n t  P a r a m e t e r
Hartigan, Perry and Kamma (1986) published the first paper that examined the 
relationship between stock market abnormal returns and trade protection. In this article.
Hartigan, Perry and Kamma (HPK) explored how trade administered protections, such as 
an escape clause, can affect the price o f a firm’s common stock. They employed both 
time series and cross sectional analysis to observe the relationships between trade 
protection and abnormal performance. The CAPM is used for both time series and cross 
sectional analysis.
HPK used time series analysis to observe if an appeal for protection and the 
subsequent administrative decision had an impact on the market value of common stock. 
They gathered information regarding weekly returns of selected firms before a petition 
for protection was filed to examine the effects of filing a petition on the value of common 
stock. First, they employed the following CAPM to estimate the normal returns;
R-tw 0^1 P i R m w  U iw
where,
Riw is the weekly return to security i at time w;
tti is a constant;
pi is the systematic risk to security i;
Rmw is the weekly rate o f return for the market portfolio; and
Uiw is the error term.
Next, they calculated abnormal returns by taking estimated parameters from the 
above regression to compute the residuals for each firm, two weeks before the filing o f a 
petition and extending it through four weeks after the final decision. The results from 
this computation represented the abnormal performance for each firm. The residuals 
were calculated by using the following equation:
Lastly, they computed the average residual by adding the residuals o f each firm 
and dividing it by all the firms in the industry to represent the mean abnormal 
performance for each industry. To adjust for any price changes during the investigative 
period, HPK calculated the Cumulative Average Residual (CAR) for each industry. The 
CAR was calculated by adding the average residuals over a period, which was before the 
filing of a petition to the date of final decision.
To test any impact of the petition on the value of a firm’s common stock, HPK 
used time series estimators of the standard deviation from the average residuals to 
calculate the t-statistics. The t-statistics were used to analyze the statistical significance 
of CAR. The analysis showed that the statistical significance of CAR varied across 
industries. Overall, the impact of protection effected only few industries. This indicated 
that the protection might affect the valuable of common stock for few industries. But the 
general statement that protection causes abnormal return could not be made.
HPK further tried to explain industry abnormal performance by using cross 
sectional analysis by employing a series of regressions. They regressed three different 
sets of equations for three different events. These three events were week of U.S. 
International Trade Commission (USITC) decision, four weeks after USITC decision and 
four weeks after final decision. They first regressed the average industry residual returns 
to the following independent variables: International Trade Commissions’ (ITC) 
decisions, import penetration (M), net operating profit from sales of the petition products 
(n) and the sales of the petitioned products as a percentage of total industry sales (S1 and 
S2). This was done to observe the abnormal returns during the week of USITC decisions.
To observe the effect on the value o f the common stock after the USITC decision, 
they regressed the average CAR with the same independent variables described above. 
The CARs were regressed four weeks after the pertinent decision as follows:
CARit =  Cti +  PitD +  PztM + p3t7C -r P4tSl +  PstS2 +  Uit
where
CARit is the Cumulative Average Residuals for industry i at time t; 
tti is constant;
P’s are the parameters;
D is a dummy variable, assigned a 1 if  a USITC decision was affirmative and a 0 
otherwise; and 
Uit is the error term.
Lastly, HPK included a new variable, PROT to their regression model to show the 
impact of the third event. The variable, PROT was assigned a value of zero for a 
negative USITC or Presidential decision, and a value o f one for a positive Presidential 
decision.
The regression results from the first event produced statistical significance for 
three of its coefficients, ITC, SI and n. The coefficient estimates for M and S2 were not 
significant. HPK explained the insignificance by stating “that the level of imports may 
not be important in determining the benefits from protection and that protection may not 
be sufficient to rescue an industry that concentrates its output in a narrow range of 
products.”
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In their 1989 paper, HKP employed the same capital market model to investigate 
the distinction between threat of injury and actual injury decisions on the stock market.^ 
In order to examine this distinction, they observed how dumping decisions (either threat 
or actual injury) affected the value o f a firm’s common stock. They hypothesized that in 
the threat of injury category, an affirmative decision would induce the effected firms to 
earn abnormal returns, whereas, an actual injury will have no effect on the firm’s 
earnings.
To prove this hypothesis they acquired data for stock prices from firms that 
reported dumping complaints, including those firms judged to be potentially affected by 
the alleged dumping. They used the normal market model to estimate the weekly rate o f 
returns. The weekly returns were from fifty-six weeks before the petition to five weeks 
before the filing date. The estimated parameters were then set to calculate the residuals 
for each firm in each week from two weeks before to two weeks after the decision week 
for each of the three events.
Next, they calculated the average weekly residual by adding all residuals of the 
firms from each petition, and then calculating the Cumulative Average Residual for each 
petition for each administrative decision. They used this result as their calculated test 
value to see if  any of the events were significant.
The results of the analysis showed that the firms would earn an abnormal return to 
an affirmative preliminary USITC decision only if  threat of an injury is the criterion. For 
the final USITC decision (actual injury criterion), there was no indication that the firms 
would earn an abnormal return. An actual injury decision generates no statistically 
significant results. The rationale for this is that the final injury decision lacks the shock
* Captial market model and market model are used interchangeably with CAPM.
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element. It is no longer a surprise, since all the other decisions are public knowledge and 
therefore the market would be able to predict accordingly.
On the other hand, abnormal returns corresponding to a threat with affirmative 
preliminary decision was evident because firms can trade on speculation. Since the 
probability that a final decision is greater with a threat with an affirmative preliminary 
decision, the firms would actively trade based on an expectation that the final decision 
would be an affirmative decision.
3. E v e n t  S t u d ie s  W it h  V a r y in g  P a r a m e t e r :
To better understand the effects of United States-Canada free trade agreement 
(FTA), Thompson (1993) examined the relationship between stock market behavior and 
the news of the FTA. Like Hartigan, Kamma and Perry (1986), Thompson also 
employed a market model to determine whether the events that led to FTA would have 
any impact on the value of firm’s common stock. The purpose of her paper was to 
observe whether or not FTA news had a significant impact on the stock prices and what 
these stock market reactions implied about the anticipated industry-level adjustment to 
free trade. She used an event study to estimate the abnormal returns during the events, 
which had the most influential impact on the implementation of FTA.
In order to test for this relationship, she lists six events, which she felt had the 
most impact on whether or not the FTA would be implemented. The events are: (1) 
threat to deny fast-tract authorization; (2) approval of fast-tract procedure; (3) 
negotiations were discontinued; (4) agreement was reached; (5) Turner gains popularity 
during the general election campaign and vows to abrogate the agreement if  elected; and 
(6) Mulroney regains popularity and wins the election. For each of the event periods
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(known as an event window), she estimated the abnormal returns by calculating the 
residuals. She used the following model to calculate the normal returns for each event 
window:
n, = a, + E
where,
rit is the daily return to portfolio i at time t; 
tti is constant;
Pi is the systematic risk to portfolio i; 
rjnt is the daily return to market portfolio;
Ditd is the dummy variable, assigned 1 for the dth day in event window e and 0 
otherwise;
Yid represents the abnormal return; and 
sit is the error term.
The coefficient estimate yid, represents the abnormal return for each portfolio i. She 
added all the abnormal returns over event window e to compute the cumulative abnormal 
return, CARie.
She tested for two different sets of hypothesis. Her first hypothesis was that FTA 
news had a significant impact on the stock prices. The second hypothesis was that the 
abnormal behavior in stock prices was attributed to new information regarding the 
anticipated impact of the FTA.
She tested for the significance of whether or not FTA news had an impact on the 
stock prices by testing the significance of all six events (joint hypothesis). To allow for 
joint hypothesis testing, she estimated the abnormal returns for all of the N industry
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portfolios simultaneously within a system of seemingly unrelated regressions for each 
event. She used this estimate to perform an F-test, which determines whether or not the 
null hypothesis should be rejected. If  the null hypothesis, which states that all o f  the 
cumulative abnormal returns for a given event window e are equal to zero, was rejected, 
than there was statistical evidence that the FTA news had an impact on the stock prices.
The second hypothesis was based on the results o f the first hypothesis. If  she 
observed that any of the events proved statistically significant, she took the statistically 
significant events to test if the abnormal behavior in stock prices are attributed to new 
information regarding the anticipated impact of the FTA rather than other new 
information learned during the event window.
In order to test such hypothesis, Thompson computed total cumulative abnormal 
return (TCAR). The TCAR was computed by first estimating the cumulative abnormal 
returns for two sets o f industries. First included those industries that were hypothesized 
to be positively affected by the FTA. Second included industries that were hypothesized 
to be negatively affected by the FTA. She added the cumulative abnormal returns within 
each set o f industries to compute the TCAR. for each event window. The TCARs were 
used to observe whether or not the null hypothesis that TCAR is equal to zero was 
significant. If the TCAR is not equal to zero, than null hypothesis can be rejected, which 
means that there is statistical evidence that these events would attribute to changes in 
expectations about the FTA.
From her joint hypothesis test, she found that abnormal returns corresponding to 
three different events were jointly significant and consistent with her hypotheses. This 
meant that out of six events, only three events, which led to the agreement of
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implementing FTA showed any significance. She used these three events to determine 
whether the abnormal returns for these events would attribute to changes in expectations 
about the FTA. To test the significance of this hypothesis she used the TCAR and found 
that TCARs corresponding to event four was statistically significant, indicating that event 
four attributed to changes in expectations about the FTA.
For this article, Thompson used daily returns data for her estimations and made an 
assumption that these daily returns are normally distributed with mean 0 and variance cP'. 
The weakness with using such data is that the daily data are not usually normally 
distributed, which means that statistical inferences such as t-test cannot be used. Also 
utilizing daily data lacks certain information due to ‘nonsynchronous trading’. By 
‘nonsynchronous trading’ we mean that there is no break in the trading activity. It 
doesn’t allow time to let certain information or event to affect the stock prices therefore 
the daily returns do not provide the most accurate data.
In a similar study, Thompson (1994) employed an event study method to examine 
whether abnormal stock market returns corresponding to FTA news are consistent with 
comparative advantage and economies of scale theory. Comparative advantage predicts 
that the Canadian industries using their relatively abundant factors intensively should 
benefit from the FTA. On the other hand, economies-of-scale theory suggest that 
Canadian firms operating in industries where the average plant scale is small, relative to 
the corresponding U.S. industries would experience economic loss due to FTA.
To observe the consistency of such hypotheses, Thompson used the same six 
major events that she employed in her 1993 paper. She used these events and estimated 
the following model:
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The first part of the equation is your normal market model [an + Pn rmj; the
second part of the equation [ZDosfccis + Pirrmt)] represents a change in the security’s
relationship with the market; and the third part represents comparative advantage and 
economies of scale. The first two variables (0ii/0ik and 0m /0ik) are the labor to capital and 
natural resources to capital ratio, respectively. These variables represent the comparative 
advantage hypothesis. The last variable, 0is/0ikq:"^ ,^ which indicates the plant scale, 
represents the economies of scale hypothesis. The Dc is a categorical variable with 
vectors of 1, 0 or -1 to signify the event windows. If event window e increases the 
perceived probability that the agreement would be implement, a one is assigned, whereas, 
if it decreased the perceived probability than it is assigned —1, otherwise it’s 0.
To observe if any of the FTA events had any impact on relative factor shares and 
relative plant scale, Thompson employed two different regression models to estimate the 
parameters. The regression models she used were a non-linear least squares estimation 
procedure (NLS) and non-linear seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). Three different 
approaches were used to compute two different sets of estimates.
In her first two approaches, she acquired firm specific data and used the NLS and 
SUR models to compute the gamma coefficients. She acquired the industry portfolio data 
for her third approach and used NLS to compute the coefficients. The first set o f
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estimation included only the last three events and the second set of estimates included all 
six events in the event window. The event windows are separated into a full event 
window and a one-day event window. The estimation period was for one year prior to 
the first event window and end on the last day o f the last event window.
The gamma coefficient estimates represent whether or not statistical evidence is 
present for each event window. Recall that the concept of comparative advantage and 
economies of scale predicts that some industries will benefit from FTA whereas, others 
might not. In this paper, Thompson predicted that the Canadian industry that used their 
abundant factors (natural resources) intensively would benefit from the FTA, whereas, 
the Canadian industries where the average plant scale is small relative to the U.S. would 
experience a loss.
In her estimations, she found the labor intensity coefficient from three-event 
sample was generally positive. The positive results indicate the relative strength o f the 
news learned during the event -window. If  the FTA news released during an event 
window was overshadowed by other new information learned during that window, a 
negative estimate may result. Furthermore, since only one coefficient estimate showed 
statistical significance, it is consistent with the hypothesis that Canada has neither a 
comparative advantage nor disadvantage when it comes to labor. This conclusion was 
made based on the weak results.
Next, she examined the hypothesis on whether or not Canada has a comparative 
advantage in production of natural resources. From the estimates, she found that the 
natural resource intensity coefficient to be positive and to be statistically significant for 
all but one of the estimations. The positive results indicate that the investors expected
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natural resource intensive firms to benefit firom the FTA. The statistically significant 
results, on the other hand, represent a strong indication that Canada has a comparative 
advantage in production of natural resources.
The last observation was on the premises of economies of scale hypothesis. She 
found that the coefficient estimate o f  the plant scale variable was consistently negative 
and was statistically significant for most of the estimations. These results suggest that 
Canadian industries where average plant scale is small compared to the U.S. would 
expect to experience economic loss during the adjustment to firee trade, which is 
consistent with the economies of scale hypothesis. All the above results are firom the 
estimates of three-event sample. The results from the six-event sample were also 
consistent with the comparative advantage and economies of scale hypothesis.
Lenway, Rehbein and Starks (1993) also employed an event study analysis to 
examine the impact of protectionism on firm wealth. To observe such impact they 
explored the history of trade policy issues in the steel industry. They formed two 
separate hypotheses. The first hypothesis was to test if the announcement of the 
imposition of trade protection had any impact on steel firms’ equity values. The second 
hypothesis was to test for the potential change in a firm’s risk characteristics.
They list six events they felt had an expected impact on the steel firms’ share 
prices. Lenway, Rehbein and Starks (LRS) employed the following market model to 
estimate the impact:
R„ = a , + a ,  Dj + p ,  R„„ + p ,  R„,dj  +
r
where,
Rit is the daily return on portfolio I at time t;
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Dj is the dummy variable, equal to 1 for every day after the announcement date
until the last observation in the sample, otherwise 0;
Pi is the systematic risk;
Rmt is the return to market portfolio;
Ejt is a dummy variable assigned a 1 if  event j occurs during t, otherwise 0; and
Ut is the error term with expected value of zero.
This portfolio approach model estimates the average industry reaction to changes in trade 
protection. LRS also employed the unconstrained approach model:
Ri, =  or, + a^Dj + p,R„, + ^  +  u,
t
to estimate a separate coefficient for every firm for every event. The main difference 
between portfolio approach and unconstrained approach model is that the dependent 
variable, Rr is the return on shares o f firm i at time t.
In order to test whether the armouncement of protective measures has an effect on 
the equity value of the firms involved LRS observed the coefficient estimates for the 
dummy variables that represented different events. The estimates firom the portfolio 
approach produced statistical significance for the initial imposition of the Trigger Price 
Mechanism (TPM) and Voluntary Export Restraints (VER) Agreement with Europe. 
Furthermore, the results of the estimated values are positive, which is consistent with the 
assumption that the TPR and VERs have positive impact on the steel industry. The TPR 
was implemented to protect the steel industry from foreign competition and VERs were 
imposed to restrict imports. The estimates for other events produced insignificant results.
The estimates from the unconstrained approach revealed that some firms showed 
statistical significance for events that led to TPM and VER. There were only four out of
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twenty-one firms that produced statistical significance and fifteen firms that resulted in 
expected sign (i.e. positive) upon announcement of the TPM program. This suggested 
that four firms earned a significant abnormal return and fifteen o f the firms had abnormal 
return in the expected direction. The estimation based on the second hypothesis 
concerning systematic risk showed inconclusive results.
Hartigan and Zhu in their 1998 Working Paper attempted to address the issue of 
how to assess material injury from antidumping petitions. They contended that the 
“material injury from dumping should be assessed in the context of the entity o f  a firm, 
rather than a narrowly circumscribed product line.”’ Furthermore, they argued that the 
investigators of antidumping petitions should examine age distribution of a firm’s 
physical capital, its access to financial capital, and the rate of innovation in the industry 
before making any injury determination.® However, due to the confidentiality o f firm 
specific data in material injury investigations, they were not able to do a thorough 
examination to support their argument.
Instead they used a market model with event study analysis to show that 
affirmative decisions in a trade investigation reduce the risk of holding a pertinent firm’s 
security. By demonstrating this, they contented the external cost of financial capital is 
lowered for the firm. Because the cost of capital has been reduced, investment in capital 
becomes more profitable for the firm. Therefore updating its physical capital makes the 
firm more competitive and less vulnerable to dumping, which means that it is less likely 
to be materially injured by dumping. In other words, if HZ are able to demonstrate that 
an affirmative decision in an AD investigation reduce the risk of holding the security of a
’ See page 3. 
* See page 4.
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petitioning firm, then indirectly, they can imply that material injury should be assessed in 
a manner suggested by them.
The following market model was used to estimate beta coefficient, which 
represents the level of risk involved in a financial investment in an enterprise:
ru =  CCio + P io ^n ,. + S )A.  +
The dependent variable is the weekly rate o f return for each petitioned firm and the 
independent variables are S&P 500 index return and dummy variables. The first dummy 
variable of the equation + P^r^,)D^~[ represents a change in security’s
relationship with the market and the other ] represents the abnormal return.
The Ds was assigned a one for observations between the event s and the preceding event 
window; and zero otherwise. The De was assigned one during event window e if the 
decision was affirmative and zero otherwise.
The events they considered were institutional procedures. For instance, once 
trade protection is petitioned, the USITC makes its preliminary material injury 
assessment. If the decision fi-om this is positive, the Department of Commerce (DOC) 
makes its preliminary dumping decision. The DOC makes its final dumping decision. If  
the DOC’s final dumping decision is positive, the USITC makes its final material injury 
decision. However, if negative decisions resulted during any of the decision making 
process, the investigation is terminated. These are the four events that Hartigan and Zhu 
(HZ) considered.
HZ used these events to estimate the risk coefficient associated with each event. 
They used SUR model to estimate the coefficients and analyze the value of estimated 
parameter for beta. Their main purpose was to observe the beta coefficient which
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“discloses the responsiveness of a firm’s security price to a market index”.^  In other 
words, a high value of beta represents a relatively risky security whereas a low value 
represents a less risky or safe security. The dummy variables represent investigation 
decisions, therefore the inclusion of the dummy variable would explain the effect it has 
on the value of beta. A firm’s risk may change due to a decision made by the 
administrative parties.
Their final outcome produced from the SUR model showed some support for their 
hypothesis. Their hypothesis was that affirmative decisions in a trade investigation 
reduced the risk of holding a pertinent firm’s security. All coefficient estimates, Ps, 
which represents the risk factor in the security’s relationship with the market, showed 
statistical significance, indicating that each event were significant in assessing the 
riskiness o f a security. Furthermore, HZ found that with an affirmative DOC preliminary 
and final decision, a positive impact on securities in relations to the market was evident. 
Thus, creating an abnormal performance for a firm. Lastly, they discovered that 
antidumping investigations might reduce the risk associated with holding a security by 
petitioning firms. This was consistent with their initial contention.
Brander, in his (1993) paper also examined the FTA between U.S. and Canada, 
and analyzed its implication on the stock market. He believed that the implementation of 
the FTA would result in abnormal stock market behavior. Brander looked at two 
different relationships. First he observed people’s reactions regarding the 
implementation of the FTA by studying the poll results. Using these poll results he 
analyzed the Canadian stock market behavior. Second, he examined the ‘trade 
mechanism’ hypothesis. The ‘trade mechanism’ hypothesis states that the stock market
’ See page 12.
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reacts abnormally from investors’ expectations about potential gains from the 
implementation of the FTA.
The implementation of the FTA depended upon whether or not a Conservative 
Party was elected. If Canadians elected a person from the Liberal Party, the probability 
o f the FTA being implemented was very small. To observe the first relationship, Brander 
acquired Gallup polls and an average poll variable from other major pollsters before the 
election to examine whether the poll results had any impact on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE). If the poll results announced a favorable outcome for the Conservative 
Party, Brander hypothesized that the TSE index would go up.
Brander employed the following model to examine relationship between poll 
results and TSE:
T, = ao+ ttL T i-i+ ap P; + an  Ni + Or Ri + ei
where,
Tj is the TSE index at time i;
T i-i is lagged value;
Pi is the election poll results at time i;
Ni is the N YSE index;
Ri is the interest rate; 
a ‘s are the parameters; and 
ei is stochastic error term.
He ran two separate Ordinary-Least-Squares (OLS) regressions; one using the Gallup 
Poll and the other using the average poll data. The coefficient estimates produced from 
the OLS regression yielded high levels o f statistical significance. However, Brander
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found that the error term was serially correlated, indicating that the results from the OLS 
regression was no longer a good estimator. To correct for serial correlation, Brander 
allowed the error term to be a first-order autoregressive (ARl) process. He employed the 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure to correct for the serial correlation:
Ti = tto+ ttL T i-i+ ap Pi + ttN Ni + ttR Ri + pei-i+ Ut 
where p is the error autocorrelation coefficient and u is normal white noise.
From this regression equation, Brander found that all but one coefficient estimate 
produced statistical significance. The coefficient estimate for interest rate, a a  was the 
only estimate that showed statistical insignificance. The adjusted was also very high 
indicating that the regression was a good fit. Furthermore, in comparing the coefficient 
estimate for Gallup Poll against average poll, Brander found that the Gallup poll 
coefficient estimate showed higher statistical significance. This suggested that investors 
might have been more responsive to the Gallup poll than to other polls.
To address the ‘trade mechanism’ hypothesis, Brander re-specified the OLS 
model by using subindices from the TSE. The data for the dependent variable, T, 
consisted of industrials, forest and paper products, energy and real estate. Brander 
predicted that the energy index would most likely be affected positively by the FTA 
because of the comparative advantage hypothesis. In addition, energy producers strongly 
supported the FTA. Moreover, he contended that the real estate index would not be very 
sensitive to FTA, because real estate is a non-traded good. According to the ‘trade 
mechanism hypothesis’ a stronger poll coefficient in the energy regressions would be 
evident and a weaker poll coefficient from the real estate index.
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Using the OLS model, Brander regressed each of the subindices to the same 
explanatory variables (i.e. Gallup poll, interest rate, lag, etc.), and found that the results 
were very weak. The calculated t-statistics were all very low with an exception o f the 
regression for the industrial index. The weaknesses in results were explained by possible 
miss-specification in the model. Brander considered two different methods to correct 
such miss-specification. First, he looked for non-stationarity in the v a r i a b l e s . T o  
correct for non-stationarity, Brander transformed the data by taking the first order 
difference and then regressing the values. From these estimates, he found that the 
regression results were quite good except for the real estate regression.
Second, he used rate of return data for the dependent variable instead of the TSE 
index to correct for possible miss-specification in the model. Whether using rate of 
return data was more appropriate depended upon error distribution and functional forms. 
From this result, he found that the significance o f the poll variables tended to be slightly 
less than in the first difference regression. Overall, the estimations were as predicted and 
consistent with the trade mechanism hypothesis.
In conclusion we find that certain events that lead to changes in trade policies can 
impact the stock market. We observed such behavior by employing the CAPM with 
event study analysis. For example, HPK (1986, 1989) determined that certain trade 
protection polices can influence stock market returns. This study used the residuals 
derived from CAPM. The residuals were then used to estimate the abnormal returns. 
This kind of study was an example of an event study with constant parameter.
If  the estimated variables are found to be non-stationary, the t-statistics can be misleading. A stochastic 
process is said to be stationary if its mean and variance are constant over time and the value o f  covariance 
between two time period depends only on the distance or lag between the two time periods and on the 
actual time at which the covariance is computed. See Gujarati (1995).
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Next, we reviewed the concept o f varying parameters. This is also an event study 
but it permits the use of different events in one model. Thompson (1993, 1994), Hartigan 
and Zhu (1998) and Lenway, Rehbein & Starks (1993) all employed the event study 
analysis with varying parameters. They examined the stock market and its reactions 
based on different events that reflected changes in the trade policies. They all employed 
the CAPM and its residuals to estimate the abnormal returns for different events. From 
these studies, we found that firms’ abnormal returns are influenced by the announcements 
that can potentially change trade policies.
B. USE OF FINANCIAL DATA TO INVESTIGATE INSIDER TRADING:
1. I n t r o d u c t io n :
Because insiders are more aware of the overall operations of their firm, it is valid 
to assume that insiders’ have greater potential to benefit firom stock transactions. 
Although, the SEC tries to prevent insiders fi-om earning abnormal returns by trading 
their own firms’ securities, insiders can still benefit fi-om such activity. The SEC 
regulates insider trading by investigating any big purchases or sales, especially if these 
activities occurred before announcements of earnings, mergers and acquisitions. 
Furthermore, to level the playing field, public firms are required by the SEC to provide 
full and fair disclosure o f information about their firm’s operations.
To show that insiders do benefit from having access to private information, many 
different studies have been performed. In this section, we review several empirical 
studies that examine insider trading on private information.
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2. I n s id e r  T r a d in g  W it h  P r iv a t e  I n f o r m a t io n :
It is evident that an informed investor can expect to earn a higher rate of return on 
their investment then an investor who is not as well informed. Furthermore, an investor 
with access to private information should earn a higher rate o f return then any other 
investor. Private information is usually first available only to corporate insiders which 
means that these insiders can use such information to gain advantage in the market. 
Further such information may be incompletely disclosed.
Elliott, Morse and Richardson (1984) examined the relationship between insider 
trading and information announcements. In this study they observed insider-trading 
behavior surrounding public information disclosures. They hypothesized that insiders 
with non-public information would engage in a profitable trading strategy. They 
performed three different studies to prove this hypothesis. First, they investigated insider 
trading surrounding public announcements. Second, they focused their study on extreme 
insider trading before public announcements and third, they performed a multivariate test.
In order to determine the insider-trading behavior surrounding certain public 
announcements, Elliott, Morse, and Richardson (EMR) list eight events to represent the 
information announcements. Four of the events were considered “good news” events and 
the remaining four events were “bad news” events. The “good news” events consisted of 
large earnings increases, large dividend increases, bond rating increases and merger 
announcements. The “bad news” events included large earnings decreases, large 
dividend decreases, bond rating decreases and bankruptcy armouncements.
EMR took the annual population frequencies o f insider trading surrounding these 
announcements and used a binomial test to determine whether or not statistical
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significance existed- The time period employed were twelve months before each 
announcement, the month of the armouncement and the twelve months following each 
armouncement. Based on the binomial test out of eight events, five showed statistical 
significance. They also found that reduced selling and/or greater buying was observed 
before merger armouncements and before large earnings and dividends increases, which 
was consistent with their hypothesis. On the other hand, they also observed reduced 
selling before two “bad news” events, which was inconsistent with their hypothesis.
From their binomial test, they also found evidence of active strategy in all three of 
the good-news cases and passive strategies in two of the bad-news cases. If  news was 
good news, insiders would buy (active strategy) whereas with bad news (passive strategy) 
insiders would either sell or delay trading.
Second they investigated the extreme insider-trading behavior before information 
events. They contended that extreme insider trading activity before information events 
would yield greater abnormal returns. The extreme insider trading was defined as 
follows: the number of sellers exceeding the number of buyers by three or more for a 
given month and vise versa. Based on this definition, the probability of extreme insider 
trading for sellers and buyers was calculated. From this calculation, they compared the 
probabilities and tested for significance. The results of these tests suggested that there 
wasn’t any particular pattern of extreme insider trading which was consistent with the 
prior use of public information signals.
Lastly, they performed a multivariate test to observe insider-trading behavior 
based on the events listed above. They used a multivariate test to account for various 
information events that may occur within the same time period. EMR employed a Logit
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model for the sample of extreme buying and selling months for the subsequent twelve 
months. They used the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) to fit the following Logit 
model:
f  = (l-exp{-x% })-'
where
+ 7 ,  EARN  - t - y ^  DINC  +  7 3  DDEC  +  7 ^  BRING  +  7 5  BRDEC
P is the probability that extreme buying occurred;
Y is a vector of coefficients, yo through ys;
X is a vector of explanatory variables;
EARN is a continuous measure o f earnings change; and
DINC, DDEC, BRINC and BRDEC are all dummy variables.
DINC represents a dividend increase and is assigned 1 if dividend increased more than 
100% and 0 otherwise. DDEC represents a dividend decrease and it is assigned 1 if 
dividend decreased more than 50%, otherwise 0 is assigned. BRINC and BRDEC both 
represent bond ratings. BRINC is bond rating increase and is assigned a 1 if bond rating 
increased and 0 otherwise. BRDEC is bond rating decrease and is assigned a 1 if it 
decreased and 0 otherwise.
The dependent variable was a discrete variable with a 1 if  there was extreme 
buying and 0 if extreme selling occurred. EMR predicted that the coefficient estimates, 
yi, j 2 and y4 , were greater than zero, whereas ya and ys were less than zero. The results 
from the MLE revealed that four out o f five coefficients were signed as expected, which 
meant that the computed coefficient estimates all had correct signs except for the 
coefficient estimate for BRINC. Furthermore, they found that only two o f their
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coefficient estimates produced statistical significance. The BRINC coefficient estimate, 
which produced an unexpected sign was the most significant relative to its standard error. 
The statistical significance for DINC and BRINC coefficient estimates indicated that the 
dividend and the bond rating increases influence insider-trading activity.
In a similar study, Joesph E. Finnerty (1976) examined the value of insider 
information. In this paper, he used a multivariate analysis to observe the relationship 
between insiders’ trading and the subsequent announcement of financial and accounting 
results. To examine this relationship, he compiled company data and data on individual 
insiders’ transactions. The company data consisted of 1,043 firms extracted from the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for the year 1967-1972 period. He manipulated the 
data into 49 variables.
He also acquired transaction files for insiders. This data identified the company 
and individual insider. It gave the number of shares traded, the number of shares held at 
the end o f the month, the date o f the transaction, and a buy-or-sell code. His observation 
consisted of 854 companies. Furthermore, he used this data to place the companies into 
one of two classes, a buying or a selling group. He selected five periods during 1971 
which were January to December 1971, April to December 1971, July to December 1971, 
October to December 1971, and December 1971.
Finnert>' used the following index to represent the insiders’ activity:
y  _ V  '-J-'J-' ij
where.
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Mj is the number of insiders trading in company j;
S ij,t is the number of shares sold by the i"** insider of j*** company during time t;
B i j,t is the number of shares bought by the i‘*' insider of the company during time t; and 
H ij,t is the number of shares held by the i* insider of the company at the end of time t. 
To determine the buying or selling categories for particular period, he used the following 
criteria:
Xj,t < 0 = buy (Group 1)
Xj,t > 0 = sell (Group 2)
Next, he reduced the independent variables from 49 to total o f 32 by performing a 
correlegram analysis. The correlegram analysis was performed to identify the most 
closely related variables and thus eliminating the extraneous independent variables. He 
retained any variable whose correlation coefficient with any other variable was greater 
than 0.400. He contended that by using such analysis, he “got the most information 
possible from the fewest independent relationship inherent in the original data.”* ’
He separated these 32 variables into six identifiable sets of linear combinations 
comprising the original variables as follows: (1) size, (2) financial leverage, (3) earnings, 
(4) operating leverage, (5) capital intensiveness, and (6) dividends. He used these six 
factors as inputs to the Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA). The second set of inputs 
to the MDA was classified as either buying or selling group. A discriminant function was 
used to assign companies to a specific group during the five periods o f  1971.
The estimated coefficients from the linear discriminant function for each factor 
provided the relative importance of these variables in assigning group membership.
' ' See page 209.
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Greater the coefficients, the more important the variables. He also employed a univariate 
t-test to evaluate the difference between insiders’ buying and selling.
He found that insiders usually sell securities o f larger companies with smaller 
earnings and smaller dividends whereas insiders buy securities from smaller companies 
with greater earnings and greater dividends. From factor analysis, he found that size, 
earnings, capital intensiveness and dividend produced statistical significance, whereas 
financial leverage and operating leverage were insignificant.
His last endeavor was to assess the strength o f the relationship between private 
information and insiders’ trading behaviors. A classification matrix was generated for 
each o f the periods. Finnerty contended that “the greater the model’s ability to classify 
an insider’s transaction as a purchase or sale on the basis of future performance, the 
greater the indication that insiders relied on their expectations of the future values o f 
these variables when they are deciding to trade.” From the results generated from the 
two-way classification matrix, he found that December 1971 was a better time for buyers 
and sellers than for January 1971. This is an indication that the closer to the profile year, 
the stronger the relation between insiders’ transactions and future operating results. 
Finnerty contended that the rational for such results was due to the insider’s lessened 
uncertainty about the near future.
A study by Baesel and Stein (1979) investigated the profitability of insider trading 
activities based on the value of information. They hypothesized that insiders with access 
to more valuable information would earn higher returns from insider trading. To test this
See page 210. 
See p a g 2 I I .
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hypothesis, they constructed three subsamples from their data, which consisted o f 111 
large TSE listed industrial firms from year 1968 to 1972.
The first two subsamples consisted o f two different groups of insiders, ordinary 
insiders and bank directors. Ordinary insiders included officers or directors o f the firm, 
as well as beneficial owners of 10% or more of the firm’s stock. The subsample 
consisting of ordinary insiders were selected by taking a firm from 111 firms and 
recording the trading activity of 01 during a month. If this same firm did not have any 
trading activity during that month, another firm was randomly drawn. This continued 
until five firms, which had insider activities, were selected for each month. This process 
resulted in 580 trades.
The bank directors included corporate insiders from the 111 large firms who were 
also directors of Canadian chartered banks. This subsample was constructed by using 
insider trades made by the bank directors in securities of other companies. The trades 
made by bank directors in their own bank were not included in the sample because of 
lack o f information. From this they observed 405 trades.
The third subsample, called a control sample consisted of 300 trades in a 60- 
month period. This subsample was constructed by taking a sample set consisting of 5 
randomly selected trades in the 111 firms for each month. The control sample was used 
to represent the firms that may have done better than the market as a whole due to 
successful management. Including the control sample eliminates or reduces potential 
survivorship bias in the data.
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Baesel and Stein (BS) argued that bank directors have access to more valuable 
information then any typical corporate insider. From this assertion, their hypothesis can 
be rephrased to state that bank directors would earn higher returns than any other insider 
from insider trading activity. To test this hypothesis, they constructed portfolios of 
securities for each of these three subsamples and used the CAPM as follows:
(l)
where,
Rp represents actual risk premium;
Up represents systematic deviations of return;
Pp represents systematic risk; and
ep is a random error term with mean zero and variance cr^
To observe whether or not the bank directors profitability was greater than other 
insiders, BS computed the abnormal returns for each of these subsample groups, by 
acquiring the residuals from equation (1) and estimating the following coefficients:
and,
where,
â  and P  are OLS estimates from equation (1); and
subscript p stands for ordinary insiders, bank directors and control sample
BS normalized the residuals from this model to correct for differences in timing 
of returns. The normalized residuals were constructed to produce a test o f the 
significance o f the return deviation for the one-month holding period x months after the
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portfolio was formed.*'’ To normalized the residuals, BS first took one-month residual t 
months after the portfolio formation as follows:
where, x signifies the elapsed months since portfolio formation. Next, BS standardized 
the residuals by using an estimate from the residual standard deviation for the 60 months 
prior to month t as follows:
P J  2 -1  <ro
n=f-61 JO
where,
^p,t,n ~ ^ p ,t  p j ^mj
The normalized residual is then presented as follows:
where, np,t,t was one month normalized residual from a portfolio which has been held for 
X months since portfolio formation.
To observe the hypothesis that the bank directors would earn a higher rate of 
return then the ordinary insiders, they analyzed the results from the normalized residuals. 
Their null hypothesis was that the normalized residuals (i.e. abnormal returns) for a 12- 
month holding period for the ordinary insiders were equal to bank directors. They used 
the standard difference of means for two normal populations with unknown variance to 
test for significance.
“Value o f  information: information from the profiability o f  insider trading”. Journal o f  Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis. (1979).
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From this they found that the calculated t-statistic was significantly high, 
indicating that the null hypothesis could be rejected. By rejecting the null hypothesis, 
BS concluded that the bank directors earned higher return from insider trading. They 
also observed the residuals for buys and sells together on average over the 12-months 
after the trades and found that the buys by the bank directors yielded higher percentage as 
compared to ordinary insiders, whereas with sells it was reversed. That is, sells by the 
ordinary insiders yielded higher percentages. This result affirmed their hypothesis that 
unusual profits were earned by the bank directors.
Next, they analyzed the timing of when abnormal profits were earned. Their 
interest in analyzing the timing was to examine the semi-strong form o f the efficient 
market hypothesis. According to this hypothesis abnormal profits could not be earned 
from publicly armounced information.
To examine whether this hypothesis was true, they observed whether or not 
insiders earned abnormal profits before or after the release of announcements. BS 
employed the normalized residuals that provided an estimate of abnormal returns x 
months after purchase to investigate the timing.
The calculated t value was statistically insignificant for most o f the residuals 
suggesting that the abnormal profits were earned following the release of announcements. 
Furthermore, the low t-value indicated that unusual profits were earned several months 
after the trade. From these results, BS concluded that the efficient market hypothesis was 
inconsistent.
Numerous studies, such as Chang and Suk (1998), Lorie and Niederhoffer (1986), 
Pratt and DeVere (1970), Jaffe (1974), and Finnerty (1976) have been done to show
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inconsistencies in the efficient market hypothesis. H. Nejat Seyhun (1986) attempted to 
reconcile the efficient markets hypothesis by correcting for any biases that may have 
occurred in the previous studies and examining the relationship between expected losses 
o f uninformed traders to that of informed traders.
Seyhun found two potential biases from previous insider trading studies, which 
may have contributed to the inconsistent conclusions of the efficient market hypothesis. 
First, previous studies generally assumed that all insider trading information became 
publicly available within two months. However according to market efficiency 
hypothesis stock price reaction occurs at the time information becomes public. By 
assuming that there was at least two-month delay in information availability, stock price 
reaction was also expected to occur after the two-month delay, thus permitting abnormal 
returns after public information, which is inconsistent with the market hypothesis. To 
correct for this bias, Seyhun used the actual dates insiders first reported their transactions 
to the SEC and the dates insider trading information was published.
Second, Seyhun argued that using the CAPM might have resulted in potential 
biases in measuring the expected return. This contention was based on recent studies that 
documented the flaws in the CAPM.'^ Because previous studies used CAPM to prove 
the inconsistencies of market efficiency hypothesis, Seyhun argued that the results of 
these studies must be viewed with caution.
Next, he attempted to observe the relationship between expected losses of 
uninformed traders to that of informed traders by investigating the bid-ask spread and 
insiders’ abnormal profits. In analyzing this relationship, Seyhun contended that recent
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anomalies concerning the efficient market hypothesis could disappear if the expected loss 
to informed traders was taken into account by including the bid-ask spread as an 
additional cost of trading/^
To show how bid-ask spread could be reflected as an additional cost of trading, 
Seyhun argued that market makers would always lose out to informed investors. Because 
market makers cannot distinguish between informed and uninformed investors, to make 
up for losses, market makers’ bid-ask spread would be greater. By setting a higher bid- 
ask spread, he minimized his losses. He could earn from uninformed traders what he lost 
to informed traders. This implied that there was a positive relation between the bid-ask 
spread and the informed traders’ abnormal profits. Moreover, if informed traders had 
access to more valuable information, the bid-ask spread would be higher than otherwise.
Seyhun argued that ignoring the relationship between the bid-ask spread and the 
expected loss to informed traders could lead to an overstatement of the realizable return 
to any active trading rule.'^ By demonstrating this positive relationship, an allowance for 
the expected loss to informed traders could be made by including the bid-ask spread as an 
additional cost of trading. The cost, then can be deducted from the gross abnormal 
return to deflate the overstatement of the realizable return.
To examine the positive relationship between bid-ask spread and the expected 
loss to informed traders, Seyhun gathered insider trading data from the SEC for 1975 to 
1981 period. Total of 790 firms was used. Their daily returns were extracted from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Out of 790 firms, 21 firms were
W ork by B anz(198I) and Reinganum (1981) showed that the CAPM based residuals are on average 
positive for small firms, and negative for large firms. Seyhun argued that this systematic bias in CAPM 
residuals can lead to biases in estimating abnormal returns in insider trading studies.
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subtracted since they did not report any insider trading during the investigative period, 
therefore the total actual number of firms used for this study was 769. From these firms, 
he grouped them by its size and by the identity of insiders.
Seyhun employed the CAPM to measure the expected returns to securities. From 
this model he acquired the residuals to estimate the abnormal return as follows:
for  f = -199,300
where,
r;,t is return to security i on day t; 
rm,t is the market rate o f return at time t;
PEj,t is the prediction error for security i at time t from 199 days before to 300 
days after each event day;
P and a  are estimated parameters from an ordinary least squares regression of rj,t on rm,t; 
and W is a dummy variable equal to one if the number of buyers exceed the number of 
sellers in a month, minus one if the number o f sellers exceed the number of buyers.
If the number of sellers equal the number o f buyers, then that month was excluded from 
the observation. An event day was considered the last insider trading day in each month.
From the prediction error estimates, Seyhun computed the average prediction 
error (APE) for time t, APEt as follows:
1APE, = — ^ P E ,j  fo r t = -199,300
1=1
Page 192.
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where Kt is the number of prediction errors on event day t.
To test for significance, Seyhun calculated the t-statistics by taking the APEt and 
dividing it by sample standard error ct (APE) as follows:
â(A PE )
Furthermore, the APE series showed a stationary of third-order autoregressive process as 
follows:
APE, = S  + 0,APE,_, +<^^APE,_^+O^APE,_^ + u
To correct for nonstationarity, Yule-Walker equation was used.
Next, Seyhun computed the cumulative daily average prediction error (CAPE) 
from event day ti to event day t .^ This was calculated by adding all the daily APE as 
follows:
CAPE(t,Q = Y,APE,
/=/,
The t-statistics for the cumulative daily APE was computed ais follows:
tiCAPE{t,t^)) =
Seyhun computed estimates from CAPE for the overall sample for purchases and 
for sales. His contention was that insiders would earn a positive abnormal return if 
insiders bought stocks before favorable information was announced. Likewise, if insiders 
refrained from buying until after the unfavorable announcement of information, the 
insiders would earn a negative abnormal return.
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From his estimates, Seyhun found that during the 100 days following the insider 
trading day, stock prices rose abnormally by 3% for purchases and decreased by 1.7% for 
sales with t-statistics of 4.4 and -2.7 respectively. This indicated that insiders buy stocks 
before the release of favorable information and sell before the release of unfavorable 
information. Furthermore, he found that insiders wait until after unfavorable information 
was announced before buying stock and wait until after favorable information before 
selling stock. This finding was based on the CAPE estimates during the 100 days prior to 
the insider trading day. The estimates from this fromula suggested that the stock prices 
declined abnormally by 1.4% with t-statistics of —2.1 for purchases and rose abnormally 
by 2.5% with t-statistics of 4.0 for sales.
Seyhun also examined the bid-ask spread by using a regression analysis. He took 
the CAPE estimates for 1 to 50 days following the insider trading and 1 to 100 days 
following the insider trading day and regressed it to firm sizes. The dummy variables 
represented different firm sizes. He ran 6 different regressions based on the size o f firms 
to observe the relationship between insiders’ abnormal profits and firm size. Out o f these 
regressions, he found that insiders from small firms earn greater abnormal returns then 
the insiders in large firms. Furthermore, the regression analysis on probability of trading 
against insiders and the log o f firm size showed negative relationship. That is, the 
probability of trading against insiders decreases with increasing firm size.
Overall, the above six regressions were an indication that the expected losses to 
insiders decreased with the size of the firm. These results showed enough evidence to 
attest to the assumption that the informed traders do impose significant costs on 
uninformed traders. Moreover, the results were consistent with the hypothesis that there
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is a positive relationship between bid-ask spread and the informed traders’ abnormal 
profit.
He performed one more analysis to show that the bid-ask spread would be higher 
if informed traders had access to more valuable information. First, he examined whether 
insiders with superior information would earn higher return. He argued that insiders with 
access to more valuable information have potential to earn higher profits. He 
investigated this analysis by using a generalized least squares regression to estimate 
CAPE on types of insiders. In order to distinguish the type o f insiders, Seyhun grouped 
them into five different categories: officers, directors, officer-directors, chairmen of the 
board of directors, and large shareholders.
Seyhun assumed that the chairman of the boards o f directors and officer-directors 
possessed more valuable information regarding the prospects o f their firm. His results 
produced significantly higher returns for the chairman and officer-directors, suggesting 
that insiders who were more familiar with overall operations o f the firm trade on more 
valuable information
To confirm that insiders with superior information earn higher returns, he 
regressed the CAPE on the dollar value of trading. However the results showed that the 
dollar value of insider trading was not related to the value o f insider information. He 
explained that this inconsistent result was that insiders in large firms and large 
shareholders of all firms trade on less valuable information.
From all these results, Seyhun concluded that the market efficiency hypothesis 
was consistent. To confirm this, he examined the abnormal profits of outsiders who 
mimic insiders. He explored this activity by analyzing the outsiders trading behavior
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following the first day insiders’ reports were received by the SEC and the day the Official 
Summary became publicly available. To observe the abnormal return o f outsiders who 
mimic insiders, Seyhun compared the outsiders’ abnormal profits to that o f bid-ask 
spread for 100 shares plus the commission fee. He found that, net of these trading costs, 
outsiders do not earn abnormal profits, thus establishing that market efficiency hypothesis 
holds.
Chang and Suk in their 1998 article attempted to examine the effects o f secondary 
dissemination of information on stock prices. They defined secondary dissemination of 
information as any information that has been made publicly available to outsiders. To 
examine whether secondary dissemination of information impacts stock prices, Chang 
and Suk (CS) examined the stock price reactions to publications o f the Wall Street 
Journal’s (WSJ’s) “Insider Trading Spotlight” (ITS) column. They considered WSJ’s 
publication of insider trading to be secondary dissemination.
CS asserted that the insider trading information from WSJ was secondary 
dissemination because the WSJ published insider transactions after it received its 
information from the SEC. They claimed that the SEC reports were the first public 
disclosure of information because the SEC was the first agency to receive reports on 
insider trading making this the primary dissemination. Their first hypothesis was that the 
stock prices would react based on SEC reports. Second, they assumed that stock prices 
might not react to secondary dissemination of information because insider trades were 
revealed on the SEC filing date. Primary dissemination would leave little or no 
discernible price reaction to the secondary dissemination of information (WSJ reports).’^  
Contrary hypothesis to this assumption was that the primary dissemination o f information
43
might be limited to a small number o f investors thus making a secondary dissemination 
more relevant. To show how insider trading information was conveyed to the market, 
they also examined the price movement before the insider-trading day until after the WSJ 
publication day.
CS acquired a sample observation of 707 insider trades firom the ITS column. 
The 707 observations were open market trades from NYSE, American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) and over-the-counter (OTC). The daily stock return data were acquired from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tape. From this 707 trades, 377 were 
sales and 330 were purchases.
In order to observe whether WSJ’s publication of insider trades had an impact on 
stock prices, CS computed the abnormal stock returns by employing the usual market 
model. They used 200 days for their estimation period and 19 days prior to insider- 
trading day through 22 days after the WSJ report day to represent their event period. 
They computed the cumulative abnormal returns to examine how the information on 
insider trades was disseminated to the market. CS used CAR to represent the stock price 
reactions or stock performance. To observe this behavior, they used three different 
events for total sales and purchases, sale and purchases individually: insider-trading day 
(TD), the SEC filing day (FD) and the WSJ report day (WD). Recall from previous 
studies that the CAR was computed by estimating the residuals and then adding the 
average prediction errors.
Their results for an event period 20-day prior to and up to the insider trading day 
was significant for total sample which included insider sales and purchases. For 
subsamples which included insider sales and purchases separately, the CAR was also
'* See page 2.
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significant suggesting that insiders do trade on private information. Moreover, they 
found that CAR three-day after the insider-trading day was significant for total sample 
observation and subsample observation o f purchases. However, they found subsample 
observation of sales insignificant, indicating that insider trading gets partially revealed to 
the market through private channels.
To observe stock price reactions during the interim period, they computed the 
CAR for event period four days after the insider-trading day (TD+4) through one day 
before the SEC filing day (FD-1). They found that CAR from the total sample and 
subsample of sales were significant whereas subsample containing purchases were 
insignificant. Two different implications were made based on these results. The first 
implication was that insiders were continuously receivring insider-trading information 
during this period. An alternative suggestion was that insiders bought stocks before the 
public announcement of favorable news and sold before the public armouncement of 
unfavorable news.
CS found that the CAR was significant when the total sample for the second 
event, which was the period after the receipt of the insider-trading report by the SEC (FD, 
FD-t-2) was computed. The CAR showed marginal significance when computed from 
subsamples. These results were consistent with their assumption that stock prices would 
fluctuate during the first public disclosure of insider trading.
Next they observed whether or not stock prices would react to secondary 
dissemination. They examined the CAR for the interim period from three days after the 
SEC filing day (FD+3) through two days before the WSJ report day (WD-2) and found 
no indication of abnormal stock performance for this interim period. However, when
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they examined the CAR for the four-day period surrounding the WSJ report day (WD-1, 
WD+2), CS found statistical significance suggesting that the ITS column has information 
content. This was consistent with one of their hypothesis that stock prices can react to 
secondary dissemination of information. They contended that stock prices would react to 
secondary dissemination of information only if the initial public disclosure attracts 
limited attention by the market.
In addition, they performed three tests to assess the sensitivity o f their results. 
First, they tested to see if any of the above results were due to confounding news 
announcements in the WSJ. To analyze this, CS acquired news announcements other 
than the report contained in the ITS column and computed the CAR to represent 
abnormal performance in the stock market. They found that this result was not sensitive 
to the confounding announcements
The second sensitivity test they performed was to investigate the price movement 
within the boundairy o f bid-ask prices. They examined such behavior by excluding 
observations with prices less than or equal to $10 because low priced stocks are more 
likely to be affected by high bid-ask spreads and are less frequently traded. The results 
based on these sample observations showed tliat the prior results were not simply driven 
by price movement within the boundary of unchanged bid-ask prices.
Finally, they examined whether the abnormal return around the WSJ report day 
merely reflected a delayed price adjustment. To observe this possibility, CS deleted from 
their observation WSJ report day too close to the SEC filing day. From this test, they 
found that the price reactions were due to WSJ publication and not from slow 
dissemination of information.
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To confirm their study CS took one step further and examined the relationship 
between insider trading and insider information using different data. They used trading 
volume to observe whether an abnormal trading activity occurs. Daily trading volume 
data was obtained for individual firms from the CRSP and NASDAQ master files. They 
employed the market model to estimate the cumulative abnormal volumes around the 
insider trading day, SEC filing day and WSJ report day. From these estimates, they 
found that the release of insider trading information was related to an increase in trading 
activities, which was consistent with other insider trading studies.
Under the Act insiders are prohibited from using private information to earn 
abnormal profit. SEC regulates insiders trading activity to prevent insiders from gaining 
advantage of the market. To prevent insiders from gaining advantage of the market 
insiders are required to report to the SEC when any stock transactions are made. 
However, even with this kind o f scrutiny, numerous studies such as Elliott, Morse and 
Richardson (1984) Finnerty (1976) Baesel and Stein (1979); Seyhun (1986) and Chang & 
Suk (1998) have documented that insiders continue to gain advantage of the market by 
using information that’s not publicly available. These studies are significant because it 
provides evidence that the insiders earn abnormal profit regardless of government 
regulation.
We also found from our review, that insiders who possess superior information 
earn greater abnormal profits confirming that the regulation of insider trading is 
ineffective. BS and and Seyhun documented these results. In addition to providing 
evidence that insiders receive benefits from private information, these studies produce 
other significant materials that are closely related to the topic of insider trading. For
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example, BS and Seyhun produced analysis on efficient market hypothesis. BS foimd 
efficient market hypothesis to be inconsistent whereas, Seyhun proved otherwise. EMR 
and Seyhun also found that insiders have tendency to buy securities of small firms and 
sell securities of large firms. CS produced information on secondary dissemination o f 
information by observing insider trading information from the WSJ and finally, Finnerty 
analyzed the value of information. In conclusion, we find that insiders use private 
Information to gain advantage of the market.
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in . DATA AND METHODS:
A . D e s c r ip t io n  o f  D a t a
The insider trading data used in our study comes from the CDA Investnet: 
Insider's Chronicle. Monthly data was used to analyze the relationship between AD 
petitions and insider trading activity. The monthly data was collected from sixty-two 
firms for the period of 1985-1987. See Appendix for our sample observation. Our data is 
a panel consisting of T x N matrix where T is our time period and N is the number of 
firms.
The Insiders ’ Chronicle is a weekly publication with tdie listings of insiders, their 
title, numbers of shares bought and sold, date of the activity, the number of shares owned 
and the market where the stock is exchanged. From this data, we extracted information 
regarding insiders and their purchases and the date of these purchases. Because the date 
o f the purchase was a weekly report, the data was aggregated in the weekly report to 
convert it into monthly figures.
Furthermore, the monthly data for an individual firm’s specific information such 
as stock prices, outstanding shares, price-eamings ratio, eamings-per-share, and Standard 
& Poor’s Index are from Security Owner’s Stock Guide for the years 1985—1987. We 
also employed the Ward's Business Directory to select public firms.
There are number of determining factors that insiders consider before making any 
investment decisions. Some of these factors such as mergers and acquisitions are highly 
confidential information and are not accessible. Thus in our study we account only for 
common observable factors: (1) price, (2) market capitalization, (2) debt/equity ratio, (4) 
earnings per share and (5) S&P 500 index to represent the explanatory variables. All of
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these variables measure health of firms and the market.
1. The price (P) variable that we used is the market price from the last trading 
day. The market price used may not be the price paid by the insiders. We did not use the 
price paid by insiders because there were two buyers on different dates in a month, thus 
having two different prices. The (P) variable was included in our model because most 
investors are interested in a stock share price. The share price provides certain 
information on how well the firm is operating.
2. The market capitalization (MKT) represents firm’s size: the bigger the firm, 
larger the market capitalization. Larger MKT does not necessarily mean that the firm is 
healthier; however, we make the argument that larger firms are safer investments.'^
3. The debt-equity ratio (DBT) was used to measure the health o f the firm. It 
represents how well the firm is doing. Our assumption was that greater the debt a firm 
has, greater the risk involved in investing in that firm.^°
4. Eamings-per-share (EPS) also measures the health of the firm; however, we 
contended that greater the earnings, safer the investments.^'
5. To measure how well the overall market was performing, we used the S&P 
500 index (SP). To be consistent, we also used the SP from the last trading day. 
Generally, the SP is used as a gauge to measure the soundness of the stock market. By 
using the SP, we contended that investors invest when they expect the SP to be high.
Because the main focus of our study was to observe the relationship between AD 
complaints and insider purchases, we used the filing of AD complaints as another
The MKTis computed as follows: P * CSO = MKT, where CSO stands for common shares outstanding.
“  The DBT is computed as follows: debt/CSO = DBT.
The EPS is computed as follows: P/PE = EPS, where PE stands for price earnings ratio. We do not use 
the PE as one o f  our explanatory variables for two reasons. First, using PE and EPS in the same model may
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independent variable. We used the filing date as a dummy variable where one was 
assigned if filed and zero otherwise. The data for the AD petitions came from the United 
States International Trade Commission (USITC) investigation reports for years 1985- 
1987. The USITC investigation reports identify the firms affected by petitions filed 
under Section 731. From this data we extracted firms that were publicly traded in the 
three major stock exchanges: the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange, and the 
NASDAQ.
For the monthly data, we acquired sixty-two public firms fi-om year 1985 to 1987. 
We chose the monthly data because it captured the timing. That is, the monthly data 
would capture the timing of insiders’ purchases based on private information - in this 
case, the AD complaints. This permits us to investigate the impact, if any, of insiders 
using information regarding AD complaints to trade.
The annual data was not considered because the variation in timing between 
insider buying and filing of AD complaints was high. In other words, if we used the 
annual data we would expect to see correlation between insider buying and filing of AD 
complaints regardless o f when these activities occurred (e.g. if insiders bought in month 
o f February and filed AD complaints in month of November) We also opted not to use 
the weekly data because there were too many zeros in our observations thus making it 
impossible to estimate the parameters.
We deleted any firms that either went public or private during the investigative 
period. We also eliminated firms involved in mergers and acquisitions during this period.
show correlation among the independent variables. Similarly, using PE and P in the same model may show 
correlation among the independent variables.
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Thus, our cross sectional data, which consisted of various firms, was the same for each 
time period. In other words, our monthly data consisted o f sixty-two firms in thirty-six 
periods, making our data a balanced panel data that was a T x N matrix with k-variables.
B. M e t h o d s
The essence of this paper is to examine whether AD petitions could be considered 
private information thus, impacting insider buying behavior. Our null hypothesis is that 
there is no relationship between insider buying and AD petitions. From our empirical 
analysis, we are able to observe whether or not relationship exists between our dependent 
and independent variables and whether or not positive or negative relationship exists 
between our dependent and independent variables.
To observe such relationships, we used a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) - 
our data was a panel with a discrete dependent variable. Our dependent variable could 
only assume two values: one, if an event occurred and zero otherwise. Because our data 
consisted o f discrete, categorical, qualitative-choice responses, we employed the 
following discrete response models: the Fixed Effects Conditional Logit (FECL) Model 
and the Random Effects Probit (REP) Model.
The FECL and REP Models are used to handle models involving dichotomous 
response variables where our dependent variable Y assumes only two values: one if a 
buying event occurred and zero otherwise. By employing these models, we are observing 
the conditional probability that an event will occur given our independent variable X, [i.e. 
P = E(Y=1/ X)]. Furthermore, the FECL and REP Models are probability models that 
has two features: (1) as X increases, P = E(Y=1/X) increases but never steps outside the
“  The timing gap between purchases and filing AD complaints may be large but if these two activities 
occurred in the same year, a one is assigned for both the dependent and the independent variable, thus
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0-1 interval; and (2) the relationship between P and X is nonlinear, that is “one which 
approaches zero at slower and slower rates as X gets small and approaches one at slower 
and slower rates as X gets very large.”^  We attempted to find whether buying behavior 
was a function o f AD petition filings by using STATA program. '^*
1. Fixed Effects
The Fixed Effects model takes into account the effects of those variables that are 
specific to individual cross-sectional units but stay constant over time, and the effects that 
are specific to each time period but are the same for all cross sectional u n i t s T h e  FECL 
Model allows conditions on only one form of heterogeneity; therefore, in our model, we 
only account for the individual specific effect. Although the FECL allows conditions on 
only one form of heterogeneity, we should pick up the time effect by when the petition 
occurs.
In the Fixed Effects Model, we assume that the individual specific effect, oc, is 
correlated with X and that the cumulative distribution of the error term is logistic. 
Furthermore, the Fixed Effects technique for the Logit Model does not require us to 
specify a particular distribution for a  conditional on X.
In specifying a discrete non-linear model in the Fixed Effects method, the 
estimated (3 coefficient, which is the slope parameter, is inconsistent. The MLEs for a,- 
and p are not independent o f each other for discrete models when T is fixed. Therefore, 
inconsistency o f estimated a, is transmitted into the MLE for p. Thus, even if N
allowing for possible correlation.
^  See Gujarati.
We also estimated our results using LIMDEP and found our results to be inconclusive. That is the 
computation from the REP Model continued to show error messages due to high number o f  zeros 
suggesting a positive definitive.
“  See Cheng Hsiao.
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approaches infinity, the MLE of p is inconsistent. One way to correct for such 
inconsistencies in P parameter is to find functions T  that are independent o f the 
incidental parameters and have the property that when a , are the true values, the function 
'P  converge to zero in probability as N tends to infinity
We used the Chamberlain’s FECL Model. That is, we assume that there is an 
underlying response variable Yit* defined by the regression relationship:
y l  +«/,
where
«// = 9; + ^ / , ,  and 
y  = \ i f  y], >0, and 0 otherwise.
7} ■ is the individual specific effect', and 
is the stochastic error term
Therefore, the FECL Model is as follows:
/= !
f=\
— (  r r  ^
whereB,. = [d,^,...,d,r]/di, =0 or 1 and
\  /= !  / = i  /
From this equation, we observed the relationship between insider trading and AD 
petitions for our monthly panel data as follows:
Pro6[y, =1]=
1 + exp {/IX}
See Cheng Hsiao.
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where,
X'X = P,AD, +/?,/», ^P .E P S , +P,MKT„ ^p .D B T , ^P ,SP , (I)
where,
Prob[y=l ] is a probability o f one if  an insider buys and zero otherwise;
A. is a vector of coefficients;
X is a vector of explanatory variables, where
ADit is a dummy variable with one if firm i filed a petition at time t, zero
otherwise;
Pit is a price of stock for firm i at time t;
MKTit is a market capitalization for firm i at time t;
SPt is the S&P 500 index at time t;
EPSit is the earnings per share for firm i at time t; and
DBTit is the debt-equity ratio for firm i at time t.
In this model the error term U| takes into account the firm specific effect and v,t 
takes into account the overall cross sectional and times series effect. That is the Vit is the 
usual stochastic error term. The v-,[ represents the effects o f the omitted variables that are 
peculiar to both the individual units and time periods.^^ In other words, v;t is the error 
term which is independently identically distributed (iid) with mean zero and variance CTv^  
InT- We further assume that u, is iid random variable with mean zero and variance
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2. Random Effects:
An alternative approach to the FECL Model is the REP Model. The Random 
Effects approach assumes the incidental parameter oc; is independent of the explanatory 
variable X. The individual specific effect in a Random Effects Model is part of the error 
term and it is uncorrelated with the regressors. Unlike the FECL Model, we must specify 
a distribution for a  conditional on X. The Log-Likelihood Function for the REP Model 
becomes:
LogL = ^ lo g  ^ccY-‘[\-F {p 'x , + a ) V ‘-dHÇalô)
/=I /=!
where H is a random sampling of a univariate distribution and 5 is an index of a finite 
number of parameters. Maximizing the above equation with respect to (3 and Ô under 
weak regularity conditions will give consistent estimators as N tends to infinity.
To estimate our model, we used the univariate Probit model for a binary outcome 
with the Random Effects as follows:
y l  = +Si , , i  = 1,..., = = —
where,
y., = \ i f  y l  > 0  and 0 otherwise', 
where,
a I is the individual specific effect or the firm  effect', and  
is purely a random effect
From this we specified our model as follows:
See Cheng Hsiao.
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Vxob{y = 1) = F (fi’x) 
where
j3'x = So+ 5, AD, +5^P,+ â , EPS, + S, DBT, + 5,SP, (2)
As with the FECL Model the REP Model has the same explanatory variables. In 
essence, we ran the same fitted regression using two different methods. These two 
models were used to estimate the relationship between insider buying activity and AD 
petitions. If we find a significant relationship between the buying behavior of insider i 
with AD petitions we would reject our null hypothesis.
The difference between the Fixed and the Random Effects is that the Fixed 
Effects considers individual specific effect a; to be correlated with X, whereas the 
Random Effects assumes otherwise. Furthermore, the primarily distinction between the 
Logit and the Probit Model is the distribution function. The logistic distribution is very 
similar to the t-distribution with seven degrees of freedom, while the normal distribution 
is a  t-distribution with infinite degrees o f freedom. The common concept between the 
two are the error term for both models take into account the individual specific effect, 
which in our case is the firm specific effect. Equation (1) and (2) examined the 
interaction between buying behavior and all the variables that measured the health of a 
firm and the market. The rationale behind running such different regression was to 
observe the significance of each beta coefficient and to observe the robustness.
Although, FECL and REP Models are not directly comparable, we observed that 
the FECL Model produced better estimates. The FECL and REP Models are not directly 
comparable because the variance of the standard normal variable (the basic random
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probit) is one, whereas the variance of the logistic distribution is £   where tc equals
Vs"
approximately 22/7.^®
3. Predicted results from the general model:
Another aspect o f interest was whether the estimated values showed positive or 
negative signs. Equation (I) and (2) express the relationship between insider trading and 
the filing of AD petitions. In estimating equation (1) and (2), we expected the coefficient 
estimates of DBT and P to have an inverse relationship with an insider buying event, 
whereas we believed the coefficients o f AD and SP to have a positive relationship. EPS 
and MKT on the other hand could either be negative or positive.
We assumed that the estimated coefficient for EPS would be positive if  insiders 
were buying on the premises of high earnings. One of the factors that measure the 
strength of a firm is high EPS. Thus, if an insider was interested in investing in a firm, 
the insider would want high EPS.
On the other hand, we contend if  insiders considered filing of AD complaints 
before purchasing securities, the coefficient estimates for EPS would be negative. The 
firms who filed AD complaints are more likely to result in affirmative injury decision if 
the firms had lower earnings. In other words, investigators of AD petitions are inclined 
to favor petitioners who had low earnings then those firms with high earnings. Therefore, 
an insider interested in buying securities based on firms’ health would want EPS to be 
high. However if an insider basis his decision to buy securities on AD petitions, then the 
insider would want a low EPS.
28 See Gujarati.
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The estimated coefficient for MKT can be positive because there are greater 
number o f insiders in bigger firms, meaning firms with large market capitalization would 
have more directors, vice presidents, etc. Thus, there would be a positive relationship 
between insider buying and the MKT, because more insiders mean more insider activity.
On the other hand, the estimated coefficient for MKT can also have an inverse 
relationship with insider buying behavior for two reasons. A study by Finnerty (1976) 
contended that insiders o f small firms tended to purchase more then insiders o f large 
firms and that insiders of large firms tended to sell more. Further study by EMR (1984) 
and Seyhun (1986) affirmed that smaller firms have prices that are less efficient in 
aggregating information. Therefore, insiders are able to take advantage of their private 
information and make abnormal returns. This means that insiders buy more from smaller 
firms. From these contentions, we assert that smaller the market capitalization, more 
insider activity therefore, an inverse relationship exists between market capitalization and 
insider buying activity.
Second, a petitioning firm’s products are more likely to constitute a higher 
percentage of smaller firm’s output than a large firm; therefore, the filing of petition 
matters more for a small firm than a large firm. In which case, insiders purchasing 
securities based on AD information should want market capitalization to be lower making 
the estimated coefficient for MKT negative.
We expect a negative sign for the estimated coefficient of P and DBT because it is 
clearly advisable to invest in a firm that has low debt and a low security price. The 
expected sign for the estimated coefficient for AD and SP should be positive. The 
probability of insider buying based on AD petition should be positive because our
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contention was that insiders bought from the information regarding filing of AD 
petitions. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient for SP should also be positive because 
SP measures the overall well being of the market. Therefore, i f  SP was high, the 
probability of an insider buying should also be high, since high SP means stronger 
market.
4. Model Re-specifications:
We asserted that P, EPS, MKT, DBT and SP are indicators that guide insiders in 
making investment decisions. In other words the explanatory variables are observable 
instruments that measures the health of the market as well as the firms. These 
independent variables were selected based on the assumption that most informed 
investors at minimum would examine these variables before making any buying 
decisions.
An informed investor interested in creating an investment portfolio would more 
than likely investigate the health of a firm as well as the over-all market. The SP was 
used to capture the market performance. The P, MKT, DBT and EPS, fundamental 
measures of the health of firms, were used to represent the strength or weakness of the 
firms.
We were also interested in re-specifying equation (1) and (2) to compute several 
different estimations by reorganizing some of the independent variables. The rationale 
behind this decision was to observe the significance of the estimated coefficient by either 
including or excluding certain explanatory variables. For instance, we re-specified our 
Logit and Probit Model as follows:
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Fixed — Effects :
?vob{y = 1) = F{X'X) 
where,
I 'x  = f fA D , + + P,DBT, + P,SP, (3a)
X x  = f fA D , + P^P, + P,EPS, + P,SP, (3b)
Random — Effects :
ŸTob(y =  1) = F(P'x) 
where,
P'x =  5^+ S, AD, + S ,P ,+  SyDBT, + S,SP, (4 a )
P'x = ^ 0  + SxAD, + J.i», + S^EPS, + 5,SP, (46)
Equation (3a), (3b), (4a) and (4b) allowed us to generate two separate regression 
models: one with just DBT and the other with EPS variable. It is clear that both EPS and 
DBT measure the health of firm. However EPS measures the health o f  a firm firom the 
earnings perspective, whereas, the DBT variable measures the health o f a firm firom the 
debt aspect. A certain appeal to separating these two variables was so that we could 
observe the interaction of the dependent variable (insider buys) with either the debt- 
equity ratio or earnings per share. By excluding the EPS variable in equation (3 a) and 
(4a), we can determine whether the estimated coefficient for DBT variable would 
produce greater or lesser significance. Additionally, it allowed us to observe if  any 
significant change was revealed in the estimated AD coefficient.
After regressing the equations (3a), (3b), (4a) and (4b) we were able to determine 
which variable (DBT or EPS) insiders were more prone to investigate before any 
investment was made. By running these two separate regressions, we discovered if 
insiders were more interested in a firm’s debt or its earnings.
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Our next re-specification o f the model was to capture the timing. If  we observed 
the estimated coefficient for AD from equation (1) and (2) to be significant, than we 
would be able to assert that there was a relationship between insider buying and AD 
petition. However equation (1) & (2) did not express the timing o f purchase. The timing 
is important because it measured insider’s ability to use the information to his/her 
advantage before it became public. In other words, an insider using AD petition as 
insider information to invest has the potential of earning rents if the insider bought before 
the AD petition was filed.
If we assumed that an insider has access to private information (i.e. the petition 
filing date) then it follows that an insider would buy his/her share of stock before or right 
at the time private information becomes public (i.e. firm files a petition). Otherwise, the 
information becomes less valuable. Thus, for those insiders who have access to the time 
o f filing o f a petition, the potential of earning rent is very high.
Our contention is that insiders with foreknowledge of the filing date would buy 
before or at the time of the petition to earn an abnormal profit. To test if such timing had 
any significance we re-specified the above model by leading it up to two months as 
follows:
Fixed — Effects:
Pro6(y = 1) = F{À'X) 
where,
(A%) = 4- (5)
Random — Effects :
^xohiy = X) = F {ffX )  
where
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ADi(t+i) & ADi(t+2) are the lead value up to two months representing the timing of 
when the petition gets filed. For example, an insider buys at time t, knowing in advance 
that AD petition will be filed at time (t+1) or (t+2), which is represented by ADI or AD2. 
The estimates from this model will identify whether or not insiders are earning rents. If 
the estimated coefficients of ADI and AD2 are positive and significant, we interpret this 
to mean that insiders are using AD petition information to invest in securities, thus 
earning rents.
Basically, from these estimates we inferred that insiders used the filing of AD 
petition to earn rents. The rationale behind such assumption is as follows: It is presumed 
that insiders have access to private information that can be used to insiders’ advantage. It 
is also presumed that trade protection, such as AD petitions can induce firms to earn an 
abnormal return as documented by numerous studies, such as HKP (1986, 1989), LRS 
(1990) and others. If the above two assumptions are true, then an insider with access to a 
petition filing date can buy his/her own firms’ stocks before or right at time of filing with 
the expectation of earning abnormal returns.
Insiders expect to earn a higher rate of return by buying stocks before the price of 
stock increase. If a firm becomes attractive to investors after the news break, then it can 
be assumed that the price of the stock will increase. If the final decisions of the petition 
are positive or affirmative, than the firm filing the petition is protected making this firm 
more attractive to investors. The old adage ‘buy low, sell high’ applies here. An insider 
can buy before the protection, when price of stock is at its market value then sell after the 
protection announcement becomes public, when the price of stock increases.
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It’s also possible to benefit even if  the final decisions o f  the petition are negative. 
Staiger and Wolak (1994) contended that the process filers could benefit fi-om forcing 
foreign rivals to undergo the investigative procedure, irrespective o f the resolution of the 
case. Thus regardless o f the outcome of the final decision, insiders can earn rents by 
buying before the filing of AD complaints.
With our monthly construction, we cannot utilize information as to which event 
preceded the other in our statistical tests. Thus we introduce lead variables of AD 
complaints to indicate purchases one month and two months in advance o f the month o f 
filing. We selected two-month leads for two reasons. First, we found that there were 
multiple filings from same firms within a three-month interval and to have led more than 
two months meant that timing would be stacked thus creating dependence from one 
month to another.^^ Second, we felt that insiders interested in maximizing their return 
would be as accurate as possible in timing. Insiders engaged in active trading to earn 
rents, pay close attention to the best time to invest. For insiders to wait to invest in 
securities three months or longer before the actual filing date seems unreasonable.
Finally, we took into account the interaction between AD petitions and firm size. 
Our contention is that AD petitions has greater impact on smaller firms since smaller 
firms are inclined to produce more homogenous products. For example, if  a large firm 
who produces diverse products filed an AD petition, the final decision would not have as 
great an impact than if a small firm that only produced one product filed the petition.
We coded our MKT into three dummy variables: one if  a firm was small a size 
cap; two if a firm was a mid-size cap; and three, if a firm was a large cap. We
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determined the size of MKT by the guidelines printed on the ‘Momingstar’. Once we 
coded our data, we entered a command that would provide an interaction term between 
AD petitions and MKT. We then ran the following regression for both Logit and Probit:
Fixed — Effects :
Pro6(y = l) = F(A%) 
where,
X'X  = J3,AD, + P f f ,  + P,EPS, + /3,MKT, + P,DBT, + P ,SZS, + p,SP, (7)
Random — Effects :
Vvobiy = \) = F{/3'X) 
where
p X  =  5^+ 5,AD.„ + + S.EPS,, + S^MKT, + 5 ,DBT, + Ô^SZS, + â^SP, (8)
where
SZS = AD * {Size o f  the mkt capitalization)
SZS is the interaction term between AD petitions and the size o f the MKT. If the 
estimated coefficient for SZS showed positive significance than we predicted the 
probability of insider buys based on the above assumption.
In conclusion, we acquired monthly data to observe the relationship between 
insider trading and AD petitions. The rationale behind using monthly data was that it 
captured the duration of insider buying behavior and the filing of AD petitions. Because 
this was a non-linear regression, we used the MLE employing the Conditional Logit and 
Probit Model for the Fixed and the Random Effects estimates, respectively. Furthermore, 
we re-specified the conditional Logit and Probit Model to account for the timing of AD 
petitions’ filing date plus the interaction term. We employed STATA program to 
produce all our estimations.
These were 64K and 256K DRAMS, and EPSOMS. They were filed in June, September, and December. 
We tested the sensitivity o f our results to the deletion o f these petitions from our set, and found only
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TV. RESULTS
As stated in our Method’s section, we predicted that the relationship between AD 
petition and insider buy is positive. In addition, the specific signs for estimated 
coefficients of EPS and MKT were unclear, because it could take on a positive or 
negative sign depending on the insiders’ motive. The individual results of each re- 
specified estimate from both Conditional Logit Fixed Effects and Probit Random Effects 
Model are presented. Moreover, we discovered that our Conditional Logit and Probit 
Models for insider buying behavior fit the data relatively well; many of the coefficient 
estimates generally had the expected signs for both Fixed and Random Effects. We also 
found that the results from the REP Model and the FECL showed robusmess.
A. Estimating the general model:
Equation (1) and (2) represent the general model where the dependent variable 
buy was regressed with the following explanatory variables: AD, P, EPS, MKT, DBT, 
and SP. The estimation from this model represents the relationship between insiders’ buy 
to that of AD, P, EPS, MKT, DBT, and SP.^° We contend that insiders who are 
considered most informed will study at minimal these variables before any purchase 
decision is made. Moreover, we assert that the EPS, DBT and MKT are reliable 
indicators in measuring the health of firms whereas SP measures the health of the market.
marginal effects on our coefficients, and no effects upon levels o f  significance.
Our estimation in this study was not to estimate the growth rate but insider’s buying behavior. 
Furthermore, our data is a panel data with the dependent variable being a discrete variable and not 
continuous. Therefore, we didn’t consider the variables, such as price, market capitalization and Standard 
and Poor’s 500 index in terms o f nonstationarity -  a time series problem. We have attempted to take log 
and log differences o f these variables and ran the same above regressions and found that the coefficient 
estimate o f  AD showed statistical significance at 5% with t-ratio produced from FECL and REP at 2.148 
and 2.618, respectively. However, the coefficient estimate for log difference in price exhibited statistical 
insignificance. Although, the S&P coefficient estimate (t-ratio computed from FECL and REP at -2.023 
and -2.007, respectively) produced statistical significance at 5% the estimated value was negative
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We compared the estimates generated from the FECL Model to that o f REP 
Model. We are searching for two different interpretations from these estimates. First, we 
examine whether our estimated values are positive or negative and second, we are 
interested in whether or not the estimated coefficients are significant. If our estimated 
values show positive sign then we interpret it to mean that relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables are positively related. In comparing the results 
from our Fixed and Random Effects, we find significant differences in parameter 
estimates, which were expected (see chapter on Methods). Recall for the FECL, we used 
the conditional MLE methods by considering the likelihood function conditional on 
sufficient statistics for the incidental parameters. The REP Model, on the other hand, 
replaces the probability function for y conditional on a  by a probability function that is 
marginal on the incidental parameter, a .^ ‘
In both the Logit and the Probit Models, P and SP coefficients show the expected 
signs with statistical significance at 5% and 10%. The coefficient estimates for EPS and 
DBT indicate statistical insignificance with both the Fixed and the Random Effects. We 
infer from these results that our explanatory variables, P and SP are reliable suggesting 
that a relationship exists between insider buy and our explanatory variables, P and SP. 
The EPS and the DBT, on the other hand, are poor indicators in explaining the insider 
buying behavior. This is inconsistent with our hypothesis that debt and earnings are good 
guidelines in gauging the health of firms.
Our interpretation regarding the signs, we observe as predicted that the estimates 
produced from both the Fixed and the Random Effects Model for the DBT coefficient is
suggesting that insiders bought when the market index was low which was inconsistent with our 
hypothesis.
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negative. Our intuitive sense was that insiders interested in earning rents were less likely 
to invest in firms that had high DBT. Therefore, as expected, we observe an inverse 
relationship between the estimated DBT coefficient and insider-buy.
The coefficient estimate for EPS is positive indicating a positive relationship 
between insider buy and EPS. This is consistent with one o f our assumptions, in which 
insiders decision to buy depended on whether a firm has reported high earnings. See 
Table 1.
Table 1
FECL REP MODEL
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value
Constant -1.1473 -5.922* 0.000
(0.19375)
AD 0.3324 2.380“ 0.017 AD 0.2447 2.877“ 0.004
(0.13965) (0.08504)
P -0.01073 -2.304“ 0.021 P -0.00269 -1.635*“ 0.102
(0.004656) (0.001644)
MKT -3.48E-11 -1.310 0.190 MKT -5.89E-12 -1.001 0.317
(2.6E-11) (5.88E-12)
EPS -0.01957 -1.332 0.257 EPS 0.0081 0.984 0.325
(0.01728) (0.0273)
DBT -5991.39 -0.745 0.456 DBT -2325.86 -0.692 0.489
(8040.279) (3363.26)
SP 0.005638 3.529* 0.000 SP 0.00229 2.934* 0.003
(0.001598) (0.00178)
Rho 0.22395
(0.03830)
Log Likelihood -1022.9562 Log Likelihood -1221.2881
Chi2 18.63 Wald Chi2 15.20
* Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 10%
Standard errors are in the parentheses.
We could also observe from Table 1 that the MKT coefficient estimate from both 
the Fixed and the Random Effects exhibit statistical insignificance. Tlie signs are
See Chang p. 165.
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consistent with our assumption because we argued that the estimated value for the MKT 
could be either positive or negative.
Finally, in analyzing our main hypothesis, we find that the coefficient estimate for 
AD produced statistical significance at 5% from both the Fixed and the Random Effects. 
We infer firom this that insiders consider filing of AD petitions when making a decision 
to buy securities. In other words, a relationship exists between insider buy and filing of 
AD petitions.
B. Examining DBT, one of the variables that measures the health of firms:
We next examine the relationship of insider buying with the same independent 
variables as in our general model (equation 1 and 2), except that we re-specified the 
model by separating the DBT and the EPS variables. Table 2 shows the results fi"om 
estimating equation (3 a) and (4a), which is a re-specification of equation (1) and (2) 
without the EPS variable. Note that the purpose of excluding the EPS variable was to 
examine whether insiders were more inclined to investigate the debt o f a firm then its 
earnings, that is DBT and EPS are two different measures o f looking at the health of a 
firm.
As with our general model we find that the AD coefficient is statistically 
significant at 5% for both the Fixed and the Random Effects, indicating that correlation 
exists between insider’s purchasing behavior and filing of AD petitions. Moreover, the 
estimated value for AD shows expected positive sign. The SP coefficient estimate also 
shows statistical significance at 5% with the expected signs. The coefficient estimate for 
P produced from the Fixed Effects shows statistical significance at 5% however the 
results generated firom the Random Effects show statistical insignificance. The
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inconsistency in the results is likely due to the differences in the distribution function 
from the FECL Model to that of the REP Model.
Now, to examine the relationship between insider buys with DBT, we look at the 
estimated coefficient for DBT. Our contention is that firms with high DBT are more 
vulnerable to bankruptcies. A firm with high debt has greater interest payments and if a 
firm is not able to pay the interest, the likelihood of filing for a bankruptcy increases. 
Therefore, we predict an inverse relationship between DBT coefficient estimate and 
insider buy.
Table 2
FECL REP MODEL
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value
Constant -1.0878 -5.995*
0.000
(0.18146)
AD 0.3197 2.292** 0.022 AD 0.23625 2.776** 0.006
(0.1395) (0.08512)
P -0.01017 -2.194** 0.028 P -0.00253 -1.499 0.134
(0.00463) (0.001686)
MKT -3.38E-11 -1.268 0.205 MKT -5.71 E-12 -1.005 0.315
(2.66E-11) (5.68E-12)
DBT -6017.963 -0.749 0.454 DBT -1913.27 -0.524 0.600
(8037.394) (3650.992)
SP 0.00519 3.348* 0.001 SP 0.00214 2.796** 0.005
(0.00155) (0.000766)
Rho 0.2239496
(0.0383022)
Log Likelihood -1029.425 Log Likelihood -1228.1134
Chi2 16.87 Wald Chi2 15.20
'Significant at 1%
" Significant at 5%
Significant at 10%
Standard errors are in the parentheses.
First we observe whether the coefficient estimate for DBT shows significance. In 
examining our estimates we find that the results generated from both the Fixed and the 
Random Effects reveal statistical insignificance suggesting that there is no relationship 
between insider buy and DBT.
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We also find that there is a minimal change in the Fixed Effects estimates o f DBT 
generated fi-om our general model to that generated fi'om this model. However, we notice 
that the coefficient estimate for DBT changed significantly for Random Effects estimate 
from —2325.855 to -1913.271 and our t-ratio decreased firom -0.692 to -0.524. In other 
words, the differences between coefficient estimate for the DBT produced from the 
general model and this model is very significant.
Second, we look at the signs for the estimated values and find that the estimates 
from both the Fixed and the Random Effects Model show expected signs for the DBT 
coefficient, which discloses a negative relationship.
C. Examining EPS, another fundamental measure that gauges the health of 
firms:
The estimates we are concerned with in equation (3 b) and (4b) are to observe the 
earnings perspective. The explanatory variables are similar to our general model but this 
time we excluded the DBT variable. We are interested in the EPS variable and how it 
conforms to our model. Earnings are another measure o f looking at the health of firms. 
As with our other models, we use both the Fixed and the Random Effects to estimate the 
parameters.
As before, in comparing our results produced firom our general model to this 
model, we find that there is infinitesimal change in the EPS coefficient estimate firom the 
Fixed Effects Model, whereas the EPS coefficient estimate from the Random Effects 
shows significant change firom 0.0081 to 0.0075. Our AD and SP coefficients continue to 
show statistical significance at 5% and above the 5% level. As before, the estimated
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coefficient for P is inconsistent. The FECL Model produced statistical significance for 
the coefficient estimate of P whereas the REP Model displayed statistical insignificance. 
See table 3.
Table 3
FECL REP MODEL
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value
Constant -1.1431 -5.873* 0.000
(0.19464)
AD 0.33426 2.402** 0.016 AD 0.2471 2.908** 0.004
(0.1391) (0.08495)
P -0.01072 -2.305** 0.021 P -0.00262 -1.584 0.113
(0.004654) (0.00165)
MKT -3.43E-11 -1.292 0.196 MKT -5.78E-12 -0.990 0.322
(2.65E-11) (5.83E-12)
EPS 0.0197 1.139 0.255 EPS 0.00751 0.857 0.391
(0.017298) (0.008759)
SP 0.00565 3.538* 0.000 SP 0.00228 2.907** 0.004
(0.001597) (0.000785)
Rho 0.22411
(0.03912)
Log Likelihood -1025.6602 Log Likelihood -1223.8859
Chl2 18.19 Wald Chi2 16.56
•Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
— Significant at 10%
Standard errors are in the parentheses.
We first examined the Fixed Effects estimates for the EPS coefficient and found 
that it is statistically insignificant, which meant that the EPS might not be a viable 
indicator in insiders’ decision to purchase securities. In other words, statistical 
insignificance indicates that insiders looking to invest may not consider EPS as an 
important factor.
Next, we observe the EPS coefficient estimate that is generated from the Random 
Effects Model and found that the Random Effects also produces insignificant results. 
Our regression without the DBT variable shows that the coefficient estimate for EPS is 
statistically insignificance. As we can observe from Table 1 and Table 3, the t-ratio
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decreased from 0.984 to 0.857. The following results might suggest that the EPS is a bad 
representative of what insiders investigate before investing or it could mean that insiders 
assess material injury from AD petitions.
Contrary to our assumption, we find that the regression equation for DBT and 
EPS are both poor indicators in determining what insiders consider before making a 
decision to invest in securities. We find that the MKT coefficient estimate is also 
inadequate in explaining the insider buying behavior. The statistical insignificance of 
DBT, EPS and MKT are explained by how these variables are computed. Because P is 
embedded in computation of these variables, insiders may just investigate share price. 
The P variable has all the necessary information for insiders to decide on whether to buy 
or not buy. To examine whether P alone is sufficient, we ran the regression with just 
AD, P and SP as independent variables. See Table 3.1
Table 3.1
FECL REP MODEL
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value
AD
P
SP
0.3223 2.320“ 0.020
(0.1389)
-0.01018 -2.198“ 0.028
(0.00463)
0.00458 3.124* 0.002
(0.001465)
Constant -1.098 -6.077* 0.000
AD
(0.1807)
0.2383 2.810“ 0.005
P
(0.08484)
-0.00252 -1.530 0.126
SP
(0.00164)
0.00205
(0.00075)
2.726“ 0.006
Rho 0.22169
(0.03703)
Log Likelihood -1032.9951 
Chi2 14.68
Log Likelihood -1231.2308 
Wald Chi2 15.10
* Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
** Significant at 10%
Standard errors are in the parentheses.
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There is only a minimal change in the coefficient estimate o f P. It is statistically 
significant at 5% from the FECL Model, whereas with REP Model it is statistically 
insignificant. From the FECL Model, we can conclude that just investigating P may be 
sufficient.
D. Insiders’ potential to earn rents:
Thus far our regression equation estimate was to observe the differences between 
DBT and EPS. We also observe whether AD coefficient estimate is statistically 
significant and positively related to insider buy. In this section, we examine whether 
insiders earn rent by using the petition filing information. Our assertion is that insiders 
who has access to petition filing date could earn rents by buying securities before the 
actual filing date. We contend that if a relationship exists between insider purchases and 
filing of AD complaints then, we can also assert that insiders use this information to eam 
rents.
Our regression equation (5) and (6) represent the assertion that insiders eam rent 
from the petition filing information. As stated earlier, we led the AD value only up to 
two months. We feel that two months is sufficient because insiders’ decision to purchase 
securities did not rest solely on filing of the petition. Therefore, for insiders to make 
purchases three to four months in advance based exclusively on the filing o f petition 
seemed unreasonable. In other words, market fluctuates on a daily basis therefore for 
insiders to buy equity three to four months in advance entirely on the date o f  filing of 
petition, might lead to unprofitable outcome. Making purchase decisions one to two 
months before the filing of petition seemed rational for this reason. See Table 4
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Table 4
FECL REP MODEL
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value
Constant -1.0795 -5.470* 0.000
(0.19734)
AD1 -0.08865 -0.607 0.544 ADI -0.00833 -0.094 0.925
(0.14601) (0.08824)
AD2 -0.26314 -1.764*** 0.078 AD2 -0.1248 -1.385 0.166
(0.14915) (0.09013)
P -001004 -2.155** 0.031 P -0.00271 -1.530 0.126
(0.00466) (0.001771)
MKT -3.61 E-11 -1.354 0.176 MKT -5.38E-12 -0.901 0.367
(2.67E-11) (5.97E-12)
DBT -4958.442 -0.611 0.541 DBT -1994.994 -0.470 0.636
(8120.829) (4247.422)
EPS 0.01961 1.131 0.258 EPS 0.00826 1.002 0.316
(0.01734) (0.008243)
SP 0.005368 3.363* 0.0010 SP 0.0022 2.771** 0.006
(0.00159) (0.000795)
Rho 0.23826
(0.04152)
Log Likelihood -1024.0367 Log Likelihood -1224.2961
Chi2 16.36 Wald Chi2 10.00
* Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
** Significant at 10%
Standard errors are in the parentheses.
From the regression, we find that ADI coefficient estimates generated by using 
the FECL Model show statistical insignificance with t-statistic of -0.607 whereas, the 
coefficient estimate for AD2 showe statistical significance with t-statistics o f —1.764. 
This suggests that there is a relationship between insider buying and filing of AD 
complaints two month in advance. However, the negative sign shows that there is an 
inverse relationship between insider buying and AD2 indicating that likelihood of 
insiders buying is less with the knowledge of the filing date of AD complaints two 
months before the actual filing date. This does not make intuitive sense. Our hypothesis 
that insiders use information regarding filing of petition to eam rents may be false. An
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alternative explanation as to the negative result may be that insiders are trying to avoid 
SEC scrutiny
The results generated from the Random Effects show statistical insignificance. 
Furthermore, it also shows negative signs for ADI and AD2 suggesting that insiders do 
not buy securities one to two months in advance, instead insiders buy securities at the 
time o f filing to eam rents.^^
As with our other models, we find that the coefficient estimate for SP remains 
statistically significant. The P coefficient estimate continues to show mixed results, 
however our contention that relationship exists between insiders purchasing behavior and 
price o f securities and market index is true. Moreover, we find that the coefficient 
estimates for DBT, EPS and MKT continue to show statistical insignificance.
E. Interaction between AD petition and the MKT:
Our final analysis is based on the assumption that insiders’ buying is related to 
interaction between AD petition and size of firms. We contend that the filing o f a 
petition has greater impact on smaller firms then larger firms, therefore smaller firms 
should have more insider activity. This contention stems from the general assumption 
that smaller firms produce more homogenous product.
For a firm that produced one or two outputs, the filing of AD petition has greater 
impact then those firms that produced diverse products. For example, if a large firm that
We are not certain as to what triggers SEC investigation. We are relatively certain that SEC will 
investigate insider trading especially if insiders trade during certain important public information 
announcements such as earnings and/or mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, it is possible that the filing o f  
AD complaints may trigger SEC investigation.
We have tried to arrange our data to show whether or not insiders bought before the filing o f  AD 
petitions by coding our dependent variable one i f  insiders bought before the filing and 0 otherwise. The 
problem with such coding was that we weren’t able to distinguish which filing was associated with which 
buying because in some instances there were multiple filings. We have also tried to code early and late 
filings but it showed inconclusive results.
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produces diverse product filed an AD petition for one of its outputs, the impact o f a 
positive injury decision on this firm is very minimal. This is because large firms do not 
depend only on this one product to remain competitive. On the other hand, an affirmative 
injury decision can potentially have a huge positive impact on small firms that produce 
homogenous products. Therefore, we assert that insiders aware of the filing of trade 
protection would purchase more equity from smaller firms then large firms.
We are interested in whether or not insiders investigate such association. If 
insiders considered the filing o f a petition and its impact on the size of firms, which we 
denoted as SZS, then an inverse relationship should exist between the coefficient estimate 
for SZS and the dependent variable, insider buy. From this assumption, we conclude that 
greater insider activity transpired from smaller firms that files for trade protection then 
large firms.
In both our Fixed and Random Effects estimations, we find that the SZS 
coefficient estimate is statistically significant at 1%, which is a strong indication that 
insiders do investigate the association between the AD petition and the size of firms. We 
also find that the coefficient estimate is negative, which is what we predicted. Our 
coefficient estimate produced firom the Fixed Effects Model is interpreted as follows: the 
log of the odds in favor of insiders buying from small size firms was -0.729; for mid-size 
firms, the log of the odds decreased by —1.458; and for large firms the log of the odds in 
favor of insiders buying decreased by -2.187. '^* See Table 5.
The percentages are computed by taking our dummy variable, where I is assigned for small-cap; 2 is 
assigned for mid-cap; and 3 is assigned a large-cap, and multiply it by the coefficient estimate. Thus, we 
have -0.74* I = -0.74 to represent small size firm; -0.74*2 = -1.48 decrease in percentage; and -0.74*3 = 
-2.22 decrease in percentage.
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Analysis from our Random Effects model also shows that SZS coefficient 
estimate is statistically significant at 1%. Furthermore, we find that the coefficient 
estimate is negative representing the inverse relationship. Our Random Effects estimates 
show that on average, the probability index that insiders buy from small firms decreased 
by -0.419 for mid-size firms the probability index decreased by -0.838; and for large 
firms the probability index decreased by -1.257.^^
Table 5
FECL REP MODEL
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value
Constant -1.1148 -5.706* 0.000
(0.1954)
AD 1.5515 4.231* 0.000 AD 0.9366 4.295* 0.000
(0.3667) (0.2181)
P -0.01069 -2.285** 0.022 P -0.00256 -1.561 0.119
(0.00467) (0.00164)
MKT -3.67E-11 -1.374 0.169 MKT -3.29E-12 -0.596 0.551
(2.67E-11) (5.53E-12)
SZS -0.7294 -3.538* 0.000 SZS -0.4129 -3.421* 0.001
(0.2062) (0.12073)
DBT -5951.95 -0.708 0.479 DBT -2428.46 -0.690 0.490
(8400.89) (3519.91)
EPS 0.01879 1.090 0.276 EPS 0.00748 0.890 0.373
(0.01724) (0.00078)
SP 0.00548 3.416* 0.001 SP 0.00212 2.705** 0.007
(0.00161) (2.72E-3)
Rho 0.2293
(0.0409)
Log Likelihood -1016.3624 Log Likelihood -1215.2925
Chi2 31.82 Wald Chi2 29.06
* Significant at 1 %
** Significant at 5%
** Significant at 10%
Standard errors are in the parentheses.
The coefficient estimates for AD and SP remains statistically significant at 5% 
whereas, the P coefficient estimate continues to show mixed results. In comparing the 
results produced from our general model to this model, we find that the estimates from
The percentages are computed as same as it is computed from the FECL model.
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both the Fixed and the Random Effects show significant change in the AD coefficient 
estimate. The t-ratio from the Fixed Effects increased from 2.380 to 4.231 whereas 
minimal changed occurred in our other estimates. The t-statistics from the Random 
Effects also increased from 2.877 to 4.295. We also find that the EPS and DBT 
coefficient estimates remain statistically insignificant but show correct signs.
F. Summary:
In summary, we find that our assumption that a relationship between insider 
buying and AD petition is apparent. All our calculated t-statistics for the AD coefficient 
is statistically significant at 5% thus rejecting our null hypothesis. Furthermore, we find 
that insiders receive a benefit from the AD petitions when insiders buy at the time of 
filing. We are not able to find conclusive evidence from our AD lead values.
The P and SP coefficient estimates produced from the Fixed Effects continuously 
produce statistical significance at 5%. The coefScient estimate for P generated from the 
Random Effects Model, however show mixed results. The SP coefficient estimate 
continues to show statistical significance from the Random Effects Model. From these 
results, we conclude our hypothesis that insiders at a minimum would investigate the 
firms’ current share price and the market index. We also find that both P and SP 
coefficient estimates produced expected signs. Our assertion is that coefficient estimate 
for P is inversely related, whereas the SP coefficient estimate has positive relation with 
the dependent variable, buy.
Our coefficient estimate for MKT show statistical insignificance indicating that an 
association between insider-buy and firm size might not exist. However, when we 
included a new variable, SZS, that represented the filing of AD petition and the size of
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the MKT, we find that the coefficient estimate produced statistical significance at 1%. 
This informs us that sizes of firms are significant when insiders consider purchasing 
equity based on filing of AD petitions.
Lastly, the coefficient estimates for EPS and DBT, two different indicators that 
measure the health of firms show statistical insignificance. These results indicate that 
insiders may consider injury requirements from filing of AD petitions or it could mean 
that insiders only consider share price when investing since EPS and DBT are both 
computed with P. The signs from these estimates, however, are consistent with our 
assumption. That is we assert that DBT coefficient estimate will produce a negative sign 
whereas the EPS coefficient estimate can take on either a negative or a positive sign.
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V. CONCLUSION:
The focus of our study was to find a relationship between filing of AD petitions 
and equity share purchases by corporate insiders. We found that such study was 
interesting for at least three reasons. First, it examined whether or not corporate insiders 
received benefits from filing of AD petitions, thereby addressing concerns about trade 
policy.
Second, it clarified some concerns regarding SEC regulatory policy that was not 
addressed in the past. SEC regulates insider trading by investigating any significant 
insider trading activity, especially after an aimouncement o f corporate information such 
as earnings, mergers or acquisition. Insiders are regulated from such activity so that they 
would not benefit hugely from private information. Our study examined whether or not 
filing of AD complaints should be considered material.
Lastly, we were interested in this study because there were no previous studies 
conducted concerning the relationship between insider buying and filing of AD 
complaints. Contributions in this area of the literature were mostly concerned with 
whether or not shareholders involved in AD complaints eam abnormal returns.
In generating our results we utilized FECL and R£P Model. Our dependent 
variable was a discrete dummy variable with one if insider bought and zero otherwise. 
The explanatory variables consisted of AD petitions, which were also a dummy variable; 
EPS; DBT; P; MKT; and SP.
In regressing the model, we expected to observe positive coefficient estimate for 
AD and SP and a negative coefficient estimate for DBT and P. For EPS and MKT 
coefficient estimate, our expected sign was either positive or negative. Our coefficient
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estimate for EPS could have either positive or negative value depending on if  AD petition 
was filed. The MKT coefficient estimate also depended on whether or not AD was filed; 
however, there were other assumptions associated with the MKT, which explained either 
the negative or the positive sign.
We produced estimates to observe several questions that arose while examining 
the relationship between purchases made by corporate insiders and filing of AD petitions. 
Our first estimate was to observe a relationship between insider buying and filing of AD, 
P, EPS, DBT, MKT, and SP.
In estimating this model, we found statistical significance at 5% for AD 
coefficient, indicating a possible relationship between insider buying and filing of AD. 
We also found that P and SP coefficient estimates were both generally statistically 
significant, whereas the MKT EPS and DBT coefficient estimate showed statistical 
insignificance.
Overall, we found evidence indicating that a relationship existed between 
corporate insider’s decision to purchase equity and filings of AD petitions. Our 
assumptions about informed investors investigating the market measures seemed evident. 
We found that most o f these variables were statistically significant with our dependent 
variable, buy. We also found that most of these variables produced expected signs, 
indicating that there may be substance to our assumptions. We also re-specified our 
models to generate several different estimates.
It is clear that both EPS and DBT measure the health o f firms, therefore, in our 
next two estimations, we separated the EPS and DBT from the explanatory variable. Our
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interest in separating these two variables were to see if corporate insiders when 
purchasing equity were more inclined to depend on a  firm’s debts or a firm’s earnings.
Our second estimation consisted o f all the same variables as our first except that 
we excluded the EPS from our explanatory variable. From this model, we found that the 
AD, P and SP all were generally statistically significant with expected signs, whereas, 
MKT and DBT coefficient showed statistical insignificance. The results were consistent 
with our first estimation.
In our third estimation, we excluded the DBT from the explanatory variable to 
observe how well EPS fits into the model. From the results generated from this, we 
found that the EPS coefficient estimate was statistically insignificant for both Fixed and 
Random Effects, indicating that corporate insiders may not investigate the earnings of a 
firm before purchasing equities. The coefficient estimates for AD, P and SP continued 
to show statistical significance, whereas, MKT coefficient estimate did not.
The purpose of the fourth estimation was to observe whether or not insiders 
earned rent. In order to observe such behavior, we specified our model to include lead 
periods for AD variable. Our assertion was that insiders could receive benefit from AD 
petitions if  insiders purchased equity before or at the time of filing. If insider buying was 
observed one or two months before the filing of a petition, we could conclude that 
insiders earned rent.
Our lead estimation produced from both the Fixed and the Random Effects for 
AD 1 showed statistical insignificance. The lead estimation for AD2 produced statistical 
significance with Fixed Effects but not with Random Effects Model. However, the signs 
for the estimates were negative suggesting that insiders buy less with knowledge of filing
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of AD complaints two months in advance. This does not make intuitive sense thus our 
conclusion was that insiders buy at the time of filing to eam benefit from filing of the AD 
complaints or insiders are trying to avoid SEC scmtiny. The coefficient estimates for P 
and SP generally remained statistically significant whereas the DBT, EPS and MKT 
coefficient estimate continue to be insignificant.
Our final estimation was to observe the interaction between AD filings and MKT. 
We contended that corporate insiders when using AD filing as source of information 
were more likely to purchase equity from small size caps than large size caps. Our 
assertion was based on the assumption that AD filings have greater impact on small size 
firms than large firms because small firms produce more homogenous products. We also 
made a contention that there is a pricing inefficiency among small size firms; therefore, 
insiders are more likely to invest in small size firms.
To control for such behavior, we generated a new variable, SZS, where SZS 
represented the interaction term between AD filing and size of the MKT. In order to 
generate such variable, we coded the MKT into a dummy variable, where 1 was assigned 
for small cap; 2 for mid-size cap; and 3 for large cap. We then, took the AD variable and 
multiplied it by our new coded variable to come up with SZS. Our estimation showed 
that the coefficient estimate for SZS was statistically significant indicating that corporate 
insiders were more likely to purchase equity from a small size firm when AD filing was 
involved.
Thus far, we have found that the MKT coefficient estimate was statistically 
insignificant indicating that MKT may be a poor representative of the explanatory 
variable. However, in our last estimation there was evidence indicating that market size
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may matter. Moreover, we found that the AD, P and SP coefficient estimates generally 
remained statistically significant attesting to our assumption that relationship between 
insider buy and AD, P and SP exist. The DBT and EPS remained statistically 
insignificant.
Overall, we found evidence indicating that a relationship existed between 
corporate insider’s decision to purchase equity and filing of AD petitions. Our 
assumptions about informed investors investigating the market and share price such as SP 
and P seemed evident. Although our contention that insiders examine EPS and DBT 
before purchasing equity showed inconclusive results, we conclude that EPS and DBT 
are good indicators in measuring health o f firms. We however did find that most o f these 
variables produced expected signs, indicating that there may be substance to our 
assumptions.
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APPENDIX
CASE 1 ROCK SALT FILE DATE: 1/28/85
MORTON
DOMTAR
CASE 2 HEAVY WALLED RECTANGULAR FILE DATE: 3/25/85
ACME 
CYCLOPS 
COPPERWELD 
KAISER STEEL
CASE 3 IRON CONSTRUCTION CASTINGS FILE DATE: 5/13/85
VULCAN
CASE 4 STEEL WIRE NAILS FILE DATE: 6/5/85
CONTINENTAL STEEL 
NORTHWESTERN STEEL 
ATLANTIC
CASE 5 DRAMS FILE DATE: 6/24/85
ATT
ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES
IBM
INTEL
MICRON TECHNOLOGY 
UNITED TECH
NAHONAL SEMICONDUCTORS
MOTOROLA
TEXAS INSTUMENT
CASE 6 CAST IRON PIPE FITTINGS FILE DATE: 7/31/85
^ITT
CASE? CANDLES FILE DATE: 9/4/85
LENOX
GENERAL HOUSEWARES
CASES ANHYDROUS SODIUM METASILICATE FILE DATE: 9/16/85
PENNWALT 
DIAMOND SHAMROCK
CASE 9 ERASABLE PROGRAMMABLE READ ONLY 
MEMORIES
FILE DATE: 9/30/85
ADVANCED MICRO DEVICE
INTEL
MOSTEK
MOTOROLA
NAHONAL SEMI CONDUCTOR 
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL 
SEEQ TECHNOLOGY 
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS
CASE 10 DRAMS 256 FILE DATE: 12/6/85
ADVANCED MICRO DEVICE
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ATT
IBM
INTEL
MICRON TECHNOLOGY
MOSTEK
MOTOROLA
NATIONAL SEMI CONDUCTORS 
TEXAS INSTRUMENT
CASE 11 HYDROGENSTED CASTOR OIL FILE DATE: 12/28/85
UNION CAMP
CASE 12 BUTT WELD PIPE FITTINGS FILE DATE: 2/24/86
LADISH
CASE 13 UNFINISED MIRROR FILE DATE: 4/1/86
DOWNEY GLASS
CASE 14 TUBELESS STEEL DISCS FILE DATE: 5/23/86
ACCURIDE 
MOTOR WHEEL
CASE 15 UREA FILE DATE: 7/16/86
AGRICO CHEMICAL 
AMERICAN CYANIMID 
FIRST MISSISSIPPI CHEMICALS 
TERRA CHEMICALS 
W R GRACE
CASE 16 TAPERED ROLLER BEARINGS FILE DATE: 8/25/86
TIMKEN
INGERSOLL RAND 
FEDERAL MOGUL
CASE 17 MALLEABLE CAST IRON PIPE FITTINGS FILE DATE: 8/29/86
ITT
CASE 18 WELDED CARBON STEEL PIPE & TUBE FILE DATE: 10/2/86
HUGHES
KAISER
CASE 19 FORGED STEEL CRANKSHAFTS FILE DATE: 10/9/86
WYMAN-GORDON 
CUMMINS ENGINE 
ATLAS INDUSTRIES
CASE 20 PORTLAND HYDRAULIC CEMENT FILE DATE: 10/30/86
IDEAL BASIC INDUSTRIES 
KAISER CEMENT
CASE 21 COLOR PICTURE TUBES FILE DATE: 11/26/86
GENERAL ELECTRIC 
NORTH AMERICAN PHILIPS
CASE 22 POTASSIUM CHOLORIDE FILE DATE: 2/10/87
AMAX
INTERNATIONAL MINERALS & CHEM 
KAISER CHEM
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KERR-MCGEE
LUNDBERG
CASE 23 MICRO DISKS FILE DATE: 2/26/87
MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURE
CASE 24 STAINLESS STEEL BUTTWELD PIPE FILE DATE: 4/2/87
LADISH
CASE 25 INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINE FILE DATE: 4/22/87
ALLIS CHALMERS 
CATERPILLAR 
CLARK EQUIPMENT
CASE 26 BRASS SHEET & STRIP FILE DATE: 7/20/87
OLIN
REVERE COPPER 
DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIED 
UNITED TECH
CASE 27 NITRILE RUBBER FILE DATE: 9/1/87
BF GOODRICH 
GOODYEAR
CASE 28 GRANULAR
POLYTETRAFLUOROETHYLENE
FILE DATE: 11/6/87
DU PONT 
ALLIED SIGNAL
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